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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DWIGHT L. KING, Administrator of 
the Estate of 'YENDELL 0. JOR-
GENSEN, Deceased, 
Plaintiff a.nd Respondent, 
vs. 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COM-
pANY, a corporation, 
Defendarnt a(nd Appellant. 
Case No. 7338 
c:ATEMENT OF CASE 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
In this brief the parties will be referred to as in the 
Court below, plaintiff and defendant. 
All italics are ours. 
As indicated in appellant's brief, this is an appeal 
from an order of the Honorable Clarence E. Baker, one 
of the Judges of the Third Judicial District Court, grant-
ing plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial. 
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During the afternoon of October 28, 1947, Wendell 
0. Jorgensen, an employee of defendant, while engaged 
in the ·performance of his duties as brakeman, suffered 
fatal injuries when he fell from the platform on the lead-
ing end of a caboose being propelled along ahead of de-
fendant's train, and was thereupon run over by the ca-
boose, engine and several cars. 
It was undisputed that defendant (a) made up the 
train with the caboose in front, and moved the train 
from Idaho Falls to the place where deceased was killed, 
a distance of over ten miles, and that (b) defendant's 
Operating Rule 802 ( J), then in force, provided: 
''Cars must not be handled ahead of engine 
between stations, except when necessary to take 
cars to or from a spur or in work train service 
and the movement then must be for no greater 
distance than necessary.'' 
and that (c) the caboose was a large boxcar converted to 
a caboose, and that (d) there was a great amount of 
swaying and pitching of the caboose while being moved 
over defendant's unballasted branch line tracks where 
the fa tal event took place, and that (e) deceased was 
required to perform his duties on the forward end of 
this caboose under the aforesaid conditions, and that (f) 
the safety chain across the aperture at the forward end 
of the platform was unsafe and inadequate in that the 
hook of said chain was so short that it would come un-
hooked when struck from beneath and that it failed in 
its function and became unhooked when deceased fell or 
IaO!t 
: ~~ 
',,j' 
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was thrown against it, thus causing him to fall forward 
onto the tracks in front of the moving train. 
~\t the time of his death deceased was 36 years old. 
He left a wife 31 years of age, a son 11, and a daughter 
4. He had 9 years seniority as a brakeman and conductor 
and was earning a little over $400.00 per month. During 
the year 1946 he earned a little over $5,000.00 and during 
19-!7, prior to his death, earned $4,12·5.00. He habitually 
delivered his checks to his wife, who paid all bills and 
family expenses. ·He contributed on an average of be-
tween $300.00 and $350.00 per month to the support of 
his family and home. (See ~r rs. Jorgensen's testimony, 
R. 578 to 587). 
- Prior to his fatal injury he was a strong, husky, 
able-bodied man. 
The computed value of $300.00 per month over de-
ceased's life expectancy, based on the United States 
Tables of Mortality, 1939-1941, Department of Com-
merce, as revealed by Exhibit 8, discounted at the rate 
of 3%, was $76,019.52, and as based on the American 
Experience Tables of Mortality, discounted at the rate 
of 3% (Exhibit "J") was $72,716.68. 
The jury returned a verdict of ''No Cause of 
Action.'' 
The trial court set the verdict aside and granted 
plaintiff a new trial. The new trial resulted in verdict 
for the plaintiff in the amount of $75,000.00 which was 
reduced to $50,000.00 by the trial court. Defendant has 
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4 
not based his appeal herein on the judgment rendered :)~ ~ 
on the second verdict. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUM:ENT 
In presenting respondent's Reply Brief to this Court 
we shall discuss the following matters: 
(A) THE LAW WITH RESPECT TO THE DIS-
CRETIONARY POWER OF ~TRIAL COURTS IN ACT-
ING UPON ~10TIONS FOR NEW TRIAL, under 
the following points and subtitles: 
POINT I. 
A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL IS ADDRESSED TO THE 
SOUND DISCR.E'TION OF THE TRIAL COURT AND ITS 
RULING WILL NOT BE REVERSED UNLESS ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION IS CLEARLY SHOWN. 
( 1) 'The rule as established by the Supreme Court 
of Utah. 
(2) The rule as established by the Federal Courts. _:r:ai 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETIONARY POWER TO 
ACT UPON A MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL IS PART AND 
PARCEL OF THE RIGHT OF TRIAL BY JURY AND THE 
EXERCI:SE OF SUCH POWER DOES NOT INVADE SUCH 
RIGHT. 
POINT III. 
WHERE THERE IS CONFLJ1CTING EVIDENCE ON THE 
QUESTION OF LIABILITY THE GRANTING OF A MOTION 
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FOR NEW TRIAL BY THE TRIAL COURT IS NOT AN 
ABlJSE OF DISCRETION AS MATTER OF LAW. 
( 1) The rule as adopted and followed by the Su-
preme Court of Utah. 
(2} The rule as adopted and followed by the Fed-
eral Courts. 
(3) The rule under California decisions. 
(B) THE TRI~-\.L COURT EXERCISED SOUND 
AXD JrST DISCRETION IN GRANTING PLAIN-
TIFF'S )lOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
(1) Defendant made up its train with the caboose 
ahead of the engine with full knowledge or means of 
knowledge that in so doing it thereby subjected its brake-
men to unusual and unnecessary danger and hazard. 
(2) There was no necessity or reason for placing 
the caboose ahead of the train and in making up and 
operating its train, as it did, defendant violated its own 
operating Rule 802 ( J). 
(3) Jorgensen's place of work, the platform on the 
leading end of the makeshift caboose as it was being pro-
pelled along, was dangerous, hazardous and unsafe. 
( 4) The makeshift safety chain (Exhibit 1) was 
inadequate, unsafe and dangerous and due to its insuffi-
ciencies was likely to and did become disengaged and 
failed in its function when put to the test of use. 
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6 
( 5) The fatal event was proximately caused by de-
fendant's various acts of negligence, combined and con-
curring. 
(C) GROUNDS URGED BY PLAINTIFF IN 
THE TRIAL COURT IN SUPPORT OF HIS Ivt:OTION 
FOR NEW TRIAL. 
GROUND I. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
BY GIVING INSTRUCTION NO.7 (R. 110). 
GROUND II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUS-
ING TO ADEQUATELY INSTRUCT THE JURY ON PLAIN-
TIFF'S THEORY OF LIABILITY AS SET FORTH AND CON-
TAINED IN PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS 
NOS. 3 AND 6 (R. 96, 99). 
GROUND III. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS NUMBERED 11 
AND 12 (R. 75, 76) WERE ERRONEOUS AND CONS.TI-
TUTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
GROUND IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ER-
ROR IN RECEIVING DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT "4", THE 
MOVING PICTURE FILM, IN EVIDENCE AND PERMIT-
TING DEFENDANT TO DISPLAY SUCH FILM TO THE 
JURY IN LIEU OF ARGUMENT. 
-r• 
·''""' 
})1 
.\. 
:JI 
JJ~ 
:!~(Rl 
(1, 
;1[/~j 
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_-\RGU1fEXT 
(~-\.) THE L~\'V 'YITH RESPECT TO THE DIS-
CRETIONARY POWER OF TRIAL COURTS IN ACT-
I~G UPOX ~lOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL. 
POINT I. 
A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL IS ADDRESSED TO THE 
SOUND DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT AND ITS 
RULING WILL NOT BE REVERSED UNLESS ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION IS CLEARLY SHOWN. 
(1) The rule as established by the Sup~em.e Court 
of Utah. 
Defendant admits in its brief that in order for it to 
prevail on this appeal it must sustain the proposition that 
the trial court abused its discretion in granting plain-
tiff's motion for a new trial. We do not believe defen-
dant has sufficiently presented the Utah law on this sub-
ject. Defendant apparently is in disagreement with this 
Court on the requirements necessary to establish abuse 
of discretion. 
This Court in Moser v. Zion's Co-op. MerDantile In-
stitution, et al, 197 P. (2d) 136, at page 139, decided Aug-
ust 2, 1948, reviewed its former decisions and declared 
the law on this point in the following language: 
"It is a matter now too well settled to admit 
of any serious dispute (and appellants do not con-
tend otherwise) that the question of granting or 
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denying a motion for new trial is a matter largely 
within the discretion of the trial court. White v 
Union Pacific Railroad Co., 8 Utah 56, 29 P. 1030; 
Van Dyke v. Ogden Savings Bank, 48 Utah 606, 
161 P. 50; Utah State National Bank v. Living-
ston, 69 Utah 284, 254 P. 781; Thompson v. Bown 
Live Stock Co., 74 Utah 1, 276 P. 651; Jensen v. 
Logan City, 89 Utah 347, 57 P. 2d 708. This rule 
applies whether the motion is based upon insuf-
ficiency of the evidence or upon newly discovered 
evidence. S.ee cases above cited and V ali otis v. 
Utah-Apex Mining Co., 55 Utah 151, 184 P. 802; 
Greco v. Gentile, 88 Utah 25·5, 53 P. 2d 1155; and 
Trimble v. Union Pacific Stages, 105 Utah 457, 
142 P. 2d 674. This court cannot substitute its 
discretion for that of the trial court. James v. 
Robertson, 39 Utah 414, 117 P. 1068, 2 N.C.C.A. 
782. We do not ordinarily interfere with rulings 
of the trial court in either granting or denying a 
motion for new trial, and unless abuse of, or fail-
ure to exercise discretion on the part of the trial 
judge is quite clearly shown, the ruling of the trial 
judge will be sustained. Lehi Irrigation Co. v. 
Moyle, et al., 4 Utah 327, 9 P. 867; White v. Union 
Pacific Ry. Co., supra; Utah State National Bank 
v. Livingston, supra; Clark v. Los Angeles & S. 
L. R. Co., 73 Utah 486, 275 P. 582; and Trimble 
v. Union Pacific Stages, supra. See also Harrison 
v. Sutter St. Ry. Co., 116 Cal. 156, 161, 47 P. 1019, 
1020.'' 
This Court from its earliest days has recognized 
the wide discretionary power residing in trial courts in 
acting upon motions for new trial. In one of its earliest 
decisions, Newton v. Brown, 2 Utah 126, 130, this Court 
held that large discretion is vested in the trial court in 
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refusing or granting a motion for new trial based upon 
the insufficiency of evidenre, and stated: 
''In the case before us, the record shows that 
the testimony was, to say the least, very conflict-
ing, and in such cases the granting or refusing a 
new trial rests peculiarly in the discretion of the 
court. \Y eddel v. Stark, 10 Cal. 302; Brady v. 
0 'Brien, 23 Cal. 243.'' 
In Davis v. Utah Southerrn R. R. Co., 3 Utah 218, 224, 
2 P. 521 (1882) this Court declared: 
"The appellant's proof of negligence was very 
meager and unsatisfactory, and was met by proof 
quite as strong, if not more convincing, of the 
entire absence of any negligent, unskillful, or 
reckless management of the respondent's engine 
on the occasion referred to. To say the least, the 
evidence upon this point was conflicting. Where 
there is a substantial conflict of evidence on a 
material point, this court will not revise the dis-
cretion exercised by the disttrict court in granting 
a new trial. Newton v. Brown, 2 Utah, 126." 
In White v. Union Fac. Ry. Go., 8 Utah 56, 57, 29 P. 
1031 (1892), this Court held that where the evidence was 
conflicting the granting of a motion for new trial by the 
trial court was in nowise an abuse of discretion. The 
Court stated: 
''One of the grounds assigned in the motion 
for a new trial is that the evidence was insuffi-
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cient to sustain the verdict. There was a manifest 
conflict in the evidence. If the plaintiff is to be 
believed, he was entitled to recover. If, however, 
the two witnesses who contradicted him on the 
vital question of his being forcibly ejected from 
the defendant's cars are to control, the evidence 
was clearly insufficient to sustain the verdict. The 
rule is ; When a motion is made for a new trial 
because of the insufficiency of the evidence, and 
the testimony is conflicting, the granting or re-
fusing a new trial is largely in the discretion of 
the trial court, and its act will not be overruled 
unless there is a clear abuse of discretion.'' 
In Tousey et al, v. Etzel et .al., 9 Utah 329, 337, 34 P. 
291 (1893), the trial court granted a motion for new trial 
without specifying the ground. However, one of the 
grounds set out in the motion was the insufficiency of 
evidence. The Court declared: 
'' * * * If it was granted on the ground of in-
sufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict,-
as we presum·e it was,-it is well settled that a 
motion for a new trial on such ground is ad-
dressed to the sound legal discretion of the trial 
court, and that such an order will not be reversed 
on appeal, unless it appears that there has been 
manifest abuse of such discretion.'' 
In Monmouth Pot)llery Co. v. White, 27 Utah 236, 75 
P. 622, this Court held that unless abuse of discretion 
clearly appears the action of the trial court in granting 
a new trial will not be disturbed. 
A consideration of the authorities cited by appellant 
here will disclose a confusion in concept as to the relative l~ 1 
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powers and authority of appellate courts and trial courts 
to order new trials. 
In James v. Robertson, 39 Utah 414, 432, 117 P. 1068, 
this Court recognized the distinction and stated: 
''While the district court, in the exercise of a 
sound legal discretion, without basing his ruling 
upon any specific error of law, may, under certain 
circumstances, posse.ss the authority to grant a 
new trial, yet we cannot do so, nor can we exercise 
the discretion which the district court might, and 
in some cases perhaps ought to have, exercised. 
In cases like the one before us, where all other 
assignments fail, and the only avaiZable assign-
ment is that the ev~dence does .wot jus 1t'ify the ver-
dict of tl1e jury, arnd where the trial oourt has re-
fused t.o grant ·a new trial, ·all that we ~are autho-
rized to do is t.o look into the evidenae t,o ascerbairn 
whether there is .any subst,antial evidence in sup-
port of every material element which plaintiff is 
required to est·ablish in order to recov·er. If there 
is such evidence, then, so far as we are concerned, 
the verdict must stand, although in our judgment, 
if we passed on the facts, the verdict upon the 
whole evidence should have been to the contrary. 
Nor can we, under the guise of ~reviewing an abuse 
of discretion by the trial court in refusing to grant 
a new trial upon the ground that the verdict is 
not supported by the evidence, pass upon the 
weight of the evidence. What the district judge 
might, or even should, have done in this regard 
we may not do for him, simply because he refused 
to do it." 
In Valiotis v. Utah-Apex Mining Co., 3:1 Utah 151, 
184 P. 802 at 807, the Court considered the relative 
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powers of the appellate and trial courts to grant or deny 
new trials. In that case plaintiff brought an action to re-
cover damages for personal injuries. The evidence was 
conflicting and after verdict and judgment for plaintiff, 
defendant moved for a new trial, one of the grounds be-
ing insufficiency of evidence. Defendant's motion was de-
nied and it appealed. Defendant did not contend that 
there was no evidence to support the verdict, but did con-
tend that the verdict was palpably against the weight of 
the evidence and that the trial court abused its discretion 
by denying the motion for new trial. The Court stated: 
"While the trial court may, as we have seen, 
review the evidence, consider its weight and the 
credibility of witnesses, and grant a new trial, if 
satisfied that there is a marked and clear pre-
ponderance of the evidence against the verdict, it 
is quite generally held that an appellate court has 
no such discretion. 
* * * * 
''The granting or denial of a motion for new 
trial founded on the insufficiency of the evidence 
to justify the verdict, where the evidence is con-
flicting, rests in the sound legal discretion of the 
trial judge, and the question directly involved on 
appeal is whether or not that discretion has been 
improperly exercised or abused. As said in the 
case of Harrison v. Sutter 'St. R. Co., 116 Cal. 161, 
4 7 Pac. 1020: 
" 'That the granting of a new trial is a thing 
resting so largely in the discretion of the trial 
court that its action in that regard will not he dis-
turbed except upon the disclosure of a manifest 
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and unmistakable abuse has become axiomatic and 
requires no citation of authority in its support.' '' 
In Perrin v. Cnion Pac. R. Co., 59 Utah 1, 201 P. 
-103. -107, this Court considered the power of the trial 
court to grant a motion for a new trial in a case arising 
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The first 
trial resulted in a verdict for defendant "No Cause of 
Action." The district court granted a new trial. The 
case was again tried and a verdict for plaintiff rendered. 
As in the case at bar defendant appealed from the judg-
ment entered on the verdict and contended that the trial 
court erred in granting plaintiff's motion for a new trial 
after the first verdict. It is to be observed that the defen-
dant here does not cite or refer in any way to the Perrin 
case. The defendant in that case argued, as the defen-
dant does here, that there was testimony in the record 
from which the jury could reasonably conclude that plain-
tiff had failed to establish her right to recover and that 
it was, therefore, error on the part of the district court 
to grant a new trial. The trial court indicated in ruling 
upon the motion for a new trial that ·error had been com-
mitted by failure to instruct upon an issue presented by 
the pleadings, the court being of the opinion that there 
was sufficient evidence to carry the issue to the jury. The 
Supreme Court held that the evidence on the issue was 
insufficient but nevertheless sustained the trial court. 
We quote: 
'' * * * no opinion is expressed as to whether 
granting a new trial would have been an abuse of 
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discretion if there had been no other grounds 
authorizing or justifying such action. 
* * * * 
" * * * It was. the duty and privilege of the 
district court, in considering the motion for a new 
trial, to determine whether the jury had given due 
weight to this uncontradicted testimony. If in the 
court's judgment the jury had failed to give such 
weight to the testimony as it was entitled to re-
ceive, it was no abuse of discretion to grant a new 
trial. Rison v. Harris, 50 Okl. 764, 151 Pac. 584. 
Our statute relating to new trials is taken from 
the California Code. Consideration of the weight 
of evidence on motions for new trial is peculiarly 
within the province of the trial courts, as has fre-
quently been held by the Supreme Court of that 
state. Sherman v. Mitchell, 46 Cal. 577; Bjorman 
v. Ft. Bragg Redwood Co., 92 Cal. 500, 28 Pac. 
591; Garton v. Stern, 121 Cal. 347, 53 Pac. 904; 
In re Martin, 113 Cal. 479, 45 Pac. 813; Holtum 
v. Germania Life Ins. Co., 139 Cal. 645, 73 Pac. 
591. To the same effect is the great weight of 
authority. 29 Cyc. 1011, note." 
In Clark v. Los Angeles & Sa~t Lake R. Co., 73 Utah 
486, 490, 275 P. 582, the defendant appealed from an or-
der denying its motion for a new trial. The Court stated: 
'' * * * While on a given state of facts and 
circumstances a court may not be justified in with-
holding a case from the jury, yet, after it is sub-
mitted to them and a verdict rendered, if the court 
on a motion for a new trial is o.f the opinion that 
the jury in rendering the verdict disregarded the 
manifest weight of the evidence, or misconceived 
it, or disobeyed the charge, or were influenced 
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through passion or prejudice, the court would not 
only be authorized, but it would be its duty, to 
grant a new trial.'' 
Other Utah cases where the general rule has been 
recognized and followed are Utah State Nat. Bank v. Liv-
ingston et al., 69 Utah 284, 254 P. 781; Hiramatsu v. 
Jlarylmul Ins. Co., 73 Utah 303, 273 P. 963; Thompson 
et al v. Bozcn Livestock Co. et al., 74 Utah 1, 276 P. 651; 
Bro1cn v. Union Pac. R. Oo., 76 Utah 475, 290 P. 759; 
Salta.s ~-.Affleck et al., 99 Utah 381, 105 P. 2d 176. 
(2) The rule as established by the Federal Courts. 
The defendant in its brief contends that the Federal 
rule must be applied because this case comes under the 
Federal Employers' Liability Act. We have no quarrel 
with this contention. We believe ·the Federal rule to be 
as broad as the Utah rule, if not broader. Rule 59 of the 
New Federal Rules of Procedure, so far as material, 
provides: 
''(a) Grounds. A new trial may be granted 
to all or any of the parties and on all or part of 
the issues ( 1) in an action in which there has 
been a trial by jury, for any of the reasons for 
which new trials have heretofore been granted in 
actions at law in·the courts of the United States; 
• * * * 
'' (d) On Initiative of Court. Not later than 
10 days after entry of judgment the court of its 
own initiative may order a new trial for any rea-
son for which it might have granted a new trial 
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on motion of a party, and in the order shall spe-
cify the grounds therefor.'' 
This is similar to the rule set forth in Title 28, Sec. 
391, U.S.C.A. which was the old rule of the Federal 
Courts. That section, so far as material, provides : 
"All United States courts shall have power 
to grant new trials, in cases where ther·e has been 
a trial by jury, for reasons for which new trials 
have usually been granted in the courts of law." 
The Federal Courts early recogniz·ed the distinction 
between the power of a trial court to grant a motion for 
a directed verdict and its power to grant a motion for 
a new trial. 
In Mt. Adams & E. P. Inclined Ry. Co. v. Lowery, 
74 F~ed. 463, Circuit Judge Lurton, who afterwards be-
came a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 
wrote an opinion in which he was primarily concerned 
with the authority of the court to grant a motion for a 
directed verdict. He pointed out, however, that the dis-
cretionary power of trial courts was much broader on 
motions for new trials: 
'' * * * Under the repeated rulings of this 
court, as well as of the supreme court, it must 
be regarded as well settled that upon a writ of 
error no question can be raised as to whether 
the verdict was against the weight of 'the evidence. 
That was a question for the sole determination 
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of the trial judge upon the motion for a new trial. 
His action in refusing a new trial upon that 
ground cannot be a~~igned as error . 
.. In X orris Y. Freeman, 3 -\Viis. 39, the Court 
said: 'There are rnany cases where the court will 
grant new trials notwithstanding there was evi-
dence on both sides, as where all the light has 
not been let in at the trial which might and should 
have been.' " 
This distinction was recognized in Felton v. Spiro, 
78 F. 5/G. Circuit Judge Taft pointed out that motions 
for new trial are addressed to the discretion of the trial 
court, and that such motions afford a remedy to a party 
for correction, by the trial court, of injustice done by 
verdict, and that new trial is one of the most important 
rights of the party defeated by a jury. 18ee Big Brushy 
Coal & Coke Co. v. Wil~Va.ms, 176 F. 529; McClellan v. 
Pyeatt, 50 F. 686. The Federal rule with regard to this 
matter is stated in Camp)beU v. American Foreign 8. 8. 
Corp., 116 F. (2d) 926, 928, as follows: 
'' * * * The granting or refusing of a new trial 
is a matter resting within the discretion of the 
trial court and will be reviewed only for a clear 
abuse of discretion.'' 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETIONARY POWER TO 
ACT UPON A MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL IS PART AND 
PARCEL OF THE RIGHT OF TRIAL BY JURY AND THE 
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EXERCISE OF SUCH POWER DOES NOT INVADE SUCH 
RIGHT. 
Defendant in its brief, commencing at page 47, ap-
parently contends that the rule governing ·the exercise 
of the trial court's discretionary power to consider and 
act upon motions for new trial in cases brought under 
the Federal Employers' Liability Act should be the same 
as the rule which governs in considering motions for 
directed verdict. Defendant further argu·es that unless 
it is sustained on this point it will suffer an unwarranted 
invasion and abrogation of its right to jury trial. The 
cases which defendant ci·tes in this part of its brief re-
late solely and entirely to the power and authority of 
trial courts to grant or deny motions for a directed ver-
dict. The authorities teach us that in England, under 
common law, it was recognized that the trial court was 
not merely a moderator at a town meeting, but had defi-
nite functions and responsibilities, among which was the 
duty of preventing miscarriage of justice by granting 
new trials in cases where the trial court felt the verdict 
to be unjust. It is that rule, unchanged, which has always 
and still governs, motions for new trial in F.E.L.A. cases 
as it does in all other law aC'tions. 
In Capital Trac. Co. v. H of, 17 4 U. S. 1, 19 S. Ct. 
580, 585, 43 L. Ed. 873, the Supreme Couvt considered 
what constitut·ed trial by jury, and observed that at com-
mon law the facts of a case tried to a jury could be re-
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examined on motion for a new trial without invading 
thB right of trial by jury: 
" 'Trial by jury' in the primary and usual 
sense of the term at the comn1on law and in the 
American Constitutions, is not merely a trial by 
a jury of twelve men before an officer vested 
with authority to cause them to be summoned and 
impaneled, to administer oaths to them and to the 
constable in charge, and to enter judgment and 
issue execution on their verdiet; but :it is a trial 
by a jury of twelve men, in the presence and 
under the superintendence of a judge empowered 
to instruct them on the law and to advise them 
on the facts, and (except on acquittal of a crim-
inal charge) to set aside their verdict if in his 
opinion it is against the law or the evidence.'' 
In Patton 'L". Tex. & Fac. Ry. Co., 179 U.S. 658, 660, 
21 S. Ct. 275, 276, 45 L. Ed. 361, Mr. Justice Brewer, 
after stating that cases are not to he lightly taken from 
juries, said: 
"At the same time the judge is primarily 
responsible for the just outcome of the trial. He 
is not a mere moderator of a town meeting, sub-
mitting questions to the jury for determination, 
nor simply ruling on the admissibility of testi-
mony, but one who in our jurisprudence stands 
charged with full responsibility.'' 
For an ·excellent review of the authorities and state-
ment of the rales prevailing in Federal Courts governing 
trial by jury and such right as effected by the discre-
tionary power of the trial judge to set aside verdicts 
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and grant new trials, see .lEtna Casualty & Surety Co. v. 
Y eraUs, 122 F. ( 2d) 350, 352-354, where the Court stated: 
''The motion to set aside the verdict and 
grant a new trial was a matter of federal proced-
ure, governed by Rule of Civil Procedure 59 and 
not subject in any way to rthe rules of state prac-
tice. On such a motion it is the duty of the judge 
to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial, if he 
is of opinion that the verdict is against the clear 
weight of the evidence, or is based upon evidence 
which is false, or will result in a miscarriage of 
justice, even though there may be substantial evi-
dence which would prevent the direction of a ver-
dict. The exercise of this power is not in deroga-
tion of the right of trial by jury but is one of 
the historic safeguards of that right. Smith v. 
Tim·es Pub. Co., 178 Pa. 481, 36 A. 296, 35 L.R.A. 
819; Bright v. Eynon. 1 Burr. 390; Mellin v. Tay-
lor, 3 B.N.C. 109, 132 Eng. Reports 351. The mat-
ter was well put by Mr. Justice Mitchell, speak-
ing for 1the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 
Smith v. Times Publishing Co., supra (178 Pa. 
481, 36 A. 298), as follows: 'The authority of the 
common pleas in the control and revision of ex-
cessive verdicts through the means of new trials 
was firmly settled in England before the founda-
tion of this colony, and has always existed here 
without challenge under any of our constrtutions. 
It is a power to examine the whole case on the 
law and the evidence, with a view to securing a 
result, not merely legal, but also not manifestly 
against justice,-a power exercised in pursuance 
of a sound judicial discretion, without which the 
jury system would be a capricious and intoler-
able tyranny, which no people could long endure. 
This court has had occasion more than once re-
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cently to say that it was a power tlzc oovztrts ought 
to exercise unflinchingly.' 
"In the smne rase, ~r r. Justice Williams, in a 
concurring opinion, traces the history of the ex-
ercise of this power and sums up his conclusion as 
follows: 
" ·Trial by jury' therefore meant, at the time 
of ~Iagna Charta, the investigation and decision 
of an issue of fact between parties litigant by 12 
men, sitting as jurors, under the advice and legal 
direction of a law judge. \Vben the verdict is ren-
dered by the jury, it is to the court of which they 
are a part. It is recorded upon the minutes of the 
court, and becomes a part of the record of the 
trial; but it does not thereby become a judgment 
of the court, unless the judge is satisfied with it, 
and specially or by general order or rule so di-
rects. He has a responsibility for the result no 
less than the jury, for it is his duty to see ~that 
right and justice are done, so far as this may be 
practicable in the particular case. If he is not 
satisfied with the verdict, it is his duty to set it 
aside, and grant a new trial before another jury. 
This was the settled practice in England as early 
as 1665. Forsyth, Jury Tr. 164. Lord Holt S'tates 
tha:t the practice of granting new trials, as a means 
of correcting the mistakes and relieving against 
the misconduct of juries, was in use much earlier 
than 1665, but accounts for its exercise not ap-
pearing in the books for the reason that, prior to 
that date, the action of the courts upon motions 
was not reported. 
* * * * 
'' 'As early, therefore, as 1665, the courts at 
Westminster did precisely what we have done in 
this case, and for the same reason. The right of 
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trial by jury was not then supposed to give to a 
successful party the right to insist on an advan-
tage due to the mistake or the willful misconduct 
of the jury, no matter how grossly unjust and 
oppressiv·e the result might be; but the super-
visory control of the court in bane, sitting as a 
court of review, was promptly exercised to re-
lieve against the miscarriage of justice. The exer-
cise of this power was then thought to be in aid 
of trial by jury. Lord Mansfield, in Bright v. 
Eynon, 1 Burrows, 390, described the effect of thus 
granting a new trial as 'no more than having the 
cause more deliberately considered by another 
jury, when there is reasonable doubt, or perhaps 
a certainty, that justice has not been done.' The 
function of the jury was well defined by Chief 
Justice Holt in Ash v. Ash, Holt, 701, nearly 100 
years before the Declaration of Independence: 
'The jury are to try the cause with the assistance 
of the judge.' They are not, and have never been, 
independent of the court of which they are a part, 
but 'their verdicts must m·eet the approval, or at 
least they must not offend the sense of justice, 
of the presiding judge, who, as the late Justice 
Grier, of the supreme court of the United States, 
was fond of saying, was by virtue of his position 
'the thirteenth juror.' ' 
"In 1757, Lord Mansfield in Bright v. Eynon, 
supra, had this to say with respect to the exercise 
of the power : 
'' 'Trials by jury in civil causes, could not 
subsist now without a power, somewhere, to grant 
new trials. * * * There are numberless causes of 
false verdicts, without corruption or bad in'tention 
of the jurors. They may have heard too much 
of the matter before the trial; and imbibed pre-
judices without knowing it. The cause may he 
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intricate: the examination n1ay be so long as to 
distract and confolmd their attention. l\Iost gen-
eral verdicts include legal consequences as well as 
propositions of fact: in drawing these conse-
quences the jury Inay mistake, and infer directly 
contrary to law. The parties may be surprised by 
a case falsely n1ade at the trial, which they had no 
reason to expect, and therefore could not come 
prepared to answer. If unjust verdicts obtained 
under these and a thousand like circumstances, 
were to be conclusive for ever, the determination 
of civil property, in this method of trial, would be 
very precarious and unsatisfactory. It is abso-
lutely necessary to justice, that there should, upon 
many occasions, be opportunities of reconsider-
ing the cause by a new trial.' 
"In l\fellin v. Taylor, supra, Chief Justice 
Tindal said: 'I cannot conceive how the benefit 
of trial by jury can be in any way impaired by a 
cautious and prudent application of the corrective 
which is now applied for: on the con'trary, I think 
that, without some power of this nature residing 
in the breast of the Court, the trial by jury would, 
in particular cases, be productive ·of injustice, and 
the institution itself would suffer in the opinion 
of the public.' '' 
See Kaufman v. AtM!ntic Greyhound Corp., 41 F. 
Supp. 252 (Dist. Ct. W. Va.) wherein a trial court grant-
ed a motion for a new trial, citing as authority the ZEtna 
Casu.a~f}y case, supra. 
From the foregoing authorities it clearly appears 
that so far as the Federal Courts ar,e concerned the ex-
ercise of the discretionary power vested in trial courts 
to consider and act upon motions for new trial cannot 
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be regarded as an invasion of the right of trial by jury, 
but on the contrary is part and parcel of such right. 
In the case here the trial court considered the motion 
for new trial and exercised his discretionary power by 
vacating the judgment bas·ed on the jury's verdict and 
granting a new trial and the case was tried to another 
jury. 
The defendant assigned no error pertaining to the 
second trial nor does it complain of the siz.e of the ver-
dict. ($75,000.00 reduced to $50,000.00 by the trial judge). 
The result of the second trial and the defendant's re-
action to it would certainly indicate that a miscarriage 
of justice occurred in the first trial and that the trial 
judge properly exercised a sound discretion in granting 
plaintiff's motion for a new trial. 
We have been unable to find any authority which in-
dicates the existence of a rule peculiar to Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act cases and defendant has cited none. 
Certainly there is no reason or justification for a rule 
differing from the general rule applicable peculiarly to 
cases arising under the Federal Employers' Liability 
Act. On the other hand, there are numerous cases aris-
ing under the F.E.L.A. where the exercise of the dis-
cretionary power of the trial courts in granting or refus-
ing new trials has been assigned as error and reviewed 
by appellate courts. In all of these instances the general 
rule has been applied. Perritn v. Union Rae. R. Co., 59 
Utah 1, 201 P. 405, and Klinge v. S.outhe.r.n Rae. Co., 
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89 Utah ~S-t. 57 P. (~d) :iGi, 37-±. are cases in point. In 
the latter case this Court declared: 
'' * * * The rule is well established that a 
presumption exists that a trial court did not err 
or abuse his discretion in granting or refusing a 
new trial, and that the burden is upon him com-
plaining of the ruling to show a clear abuse of 
discretion. Utah State Nat. Bank v. Livingston, 
69 e tah. 28-±, 25-! P. 781 ; Thomas v. Ogden Rapid 
Transit Co., 47 Utah, 595, 155 P. 436; Hirabelli 
v. Daniels, 44 Utah, 88, 138 P. 1172; White v. 
Union Pac. R. Co., 8 Utah, 56, 29 P. 1030; Alt 
v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 5 S. D. 20, 57 N. W. 
1126, 1128; Koch v. Imhof, 315 Pa. 145, 172 A. 
672, 673; 0 'Barr v. Pioneer Life Ins. Co., 172 S.C. 
72, 172 S.E. 769; 4 C.J. 798. In the cas·e of Alt v. 
Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., supra, that court, in a per-
sonal injury case, stated that: 'It requires a court 
as well as a jury to try causes of this nature, and, 
while the jury is the judge of the facts viewed in 
the light of the law, as a rule no verdict should 
stand when, in the sound judgment 'Of the trial 
court, it operates as a wrong between the parties 
which might be remedied upon a retrial.' '' 
In Cheffey v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 79 F. Supp. 252 
(Dist. Ct. Pa. 1948), an action arising under the Federal 
Employers' LiabHity Act, a F·ederal District Court 
granted a motion for new trial in reliance upon JEtna 
CaSUialty & Surety Comparny v. YeaUs, 122 F. (2d) 350, 
heretofore cited in this brief. 
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POINT III. 
WHERE THERE IS CONFLICTING EVIDENCE ON THE 
QUESTION OF LIABILITY THE GRANTING OF A MOTION 
FOR NEW TRIAL BY THE TRIAL COURT IS NOT AN 
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AS MATTER OF LAW. 
( 1) The rule as adopted and followed by th~ 
Supreme Court of Ut,ah. 
We respectfully submit that the weight of the evi-
dence on the matter of liability was strongly in favor 
of plaintiff here, and tha:t the verdict ''No Cause of 
Action'' constituted a grav,e miscarriage of justice. How-
ever, on this appeal it is not necessary ror plaintiff to 
establish or show that the weight of evidence was in his 
favor or that the verdict constituted a miscarriage of 
justice. 
Under the decisions of this Court the order of a trial 
court granting a motion for new trial will be sustained 
on appeal if it appears that there was a conflict in the 
evidence upon the material issues of liability. Where 
the evidence is conflicting and the trial court, in the 
exercise of its discretionary power, grants a new trial, 
there can be no abuse of discretion as matter of law. 
This was clearly stated in the case of Utah 8tlate Nat. 
Bank v. Livingston et ~al., 69 Utah 284, 286, 254 P. 781. 
The action in that case was tried twice in the District 
Court. In the first trial a verdict was returned in favor 
of defendants and upon plaintiff's motion for a new trial 
grounded upon insufficiency of evidence the verdict was 
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set aside and a new trial granted. The defendant assign-
ed the act of the trial court as error. This Court stated: 
'' . :-\.ppellants complain that the action of the 
trial court in setting aside the verdict in favor of 
defendants and granting a new trial was an abuse 
of discretion and error, for which the judgment 
apealed from should be reversed and judgment 
ordered entered upon the first verdict. Such a 
claim was sustained in Hirabelli v. Daniels, 44 
Ptah, 88, 138 P. 1172, but upon a record and state 
of facts quite dissimilar from the case at bar. 
The granting of a new trial rests so largely in 
the discretion of the trial court that its action in 
that regard will not be disturbed unless there is 
a clear abuse of discretion. ·v ali otis v. Utah Apex 
~lining Co., 55 Utah, 151, 184 P. 802. The evidence 
at the first trial of the instant case was very 
similar in its general aspects to the evidence at 
the second trial presently to be considered. With-
out reviewing the evidence taken at the first trial 
it is sufficient in this connection to state that upon 
the essential matter in dispute the evidence was 
substantially conflicting. As was said in the cas·e 
last. above cited: 
'' 'In such .a case this court must hold as a 
matter of ~aw that no ·abuse of discretion is 
shown.' · 
''The contention that the tria.l count, abused 
its discretion by gnanti.ng a new trial is therefore 
denied.'' 
Defendant has never contended that there was not 
ample and sufficient evidence to support plaintiff's 
charges of neglect. On the authority of the above case 
there was no abuse of discretion her·e as matter of law. 
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(2) The rule .as adopted and tonowed by the Fed-
eral Court.s. 
The rule is firmly established in the Federal Courts 
that a trial court does not abuse its discretion by grant-
ing a new trial for insufficiency of the evidence where 
there is a conflict in the evidence or where there is any 
evidence that would support a verdict in favor of the 
moving party. 
In General Accident Fire & Life Assur. Oorp. v. 
Dickinso.n, 61 F. Supp. 153, 156, a District Judge granted 
plaintiff's motion for a new trial. The Court reviewed 
the evidence and granted the motion in reliance upon 
statements of the rule contained in a number of Cali-
fornia cases. We quote: 
'' 'A motion for new trial on the ground that 
the verdi~t is not sustained by the evidence is 
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial 
court.' 1Etna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Reliable 
Auto Tire Co., 8 Cir., 58 F. 2d 100, 104; and in 
respe~t to sufficiency of the evidence on disputed 
matters of fact 'is addressed to him as the thir-
teenth juror.' McBride v. Neal, 7 Cir., 214 F. 966, 
968.'' 
The Court then quotes from the California case of 
Green v. Soule, 145 Cal. 96, 102, 78 P. 337, 340, as follows: 
''This view has been repeatedly reiterated by 
the Supreme Court and the Distric;t Courts of 
Appeal of the State of California. The Supreme 
Court recently stated in Re Green's Estate, 154 P. 
2d 692, that a trial court does not abuse its dis-
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cretion in granting· a new trial for insufficiency 
of evidence where there is a conflict in the evi-
dence or where there is any evidence which would 
support a judgment in favor of the moving 
party." 
And the Court finally quotes from Grover v. Sharp, 
another California case, reported at 153 P. (2d) 83, 84, 
as follows: 
" '* * * It is thoroughly settled in California 
that a trial judge in passing on a motion for a 
new trial is not bound by conflicts in the evidence; 
that in fact he sits as a thirteenth juror with the 
duty resting on him of revi·ewing the evidence 
and passing on its sufficiency; that if he is dis-
satisfied with the verdict and concludes that it 
has resulted in a miscarriage of justice it becomes 
his duty to grant the motion.' This Court, so sit-
ting as a thirteenth juror, has reviewed the evi-
dence, is dissatisfied with the verdicts and con-
cluded that they have resulted in . a miscarriage 
of justice.'' 
In Clement v. Wilson, 135 Fed. 749, the Oourt stated: 
''This is a writ of error by the defendant in 
the court below brought to review an order setting 
aside a verdict in favor of the defendant and di-
recting a new trial. The verdict was set aside be-
cause the court was of the opinion that it had not 
been rendered by an impartial jury. There are 
two reasons why-this writ of error cannot be en-
tertained: (1) It has long been the established 
law in the courts of the United States that to 
grant or refus·e a ne·w trial rests in the sound dis-
cretion of the court to which the motion is ad-
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dressed, and the r~esult cannot be made the sub-
je~t of a review upon a writ of error. Newcomb 
v. Wood, 97 U. S. 581, 24 L. Ed. 1085; Nudd v. 
Burrows, 91 U.S. 426, 23 L. Ed. 286; Railroad 
Co. v. Horst, 93 U. S. 291, 23 L. Ed. 898. '' 
An interesting application of this rule is found in 
the language of the court in the case of Baltimore & 0. 
R. Co. v. Baunders, 159 F. (2d) 481, 485. A verdict was 
rendered for plaintiff and defendant appeals, one of its 
contentions being that the case was not properly sub-
mitted to the jury. The Court states: 
'' * * * Counsel for appellant do not press 
the motion for directed verdict on appeal, but 
argue that the ~erdict should not be allowed to 
stand because contrary to the weight of the evi-
dence. This, however, is a matter resting in the 
discretion of the trial court. Only where verdict 
should have been directed, because the evidence 
was all one way or so clearly so that reasonable 
men coiUld .not have differed as to the facts, do we 
have jurisd,iction to review the 1t:rial oo!Urt 's action, 
and this on the theory that the question then be-
comes one of Zaw . .LEtna Casualty & Surety Co. 
v. Yeatts, 4 Cir., 122 F. 2d 350, 352-3'54." 
As we construe the last s·en'tence of the above quo-
tation and applying it to the case at bar, under the Fed-
eral rule the trial court's act in granting a motion for 
a new trial can only be reversed wher.e the question be-
comes one of law. 
Defendant, in the case at bar, cannot prevail on the 
error assigned her;e unless it is made to appear that the 
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evidence introduced at the trial of this case was such 
that it would have been entitled to a directed verdict in 
its favor. D€fendant has never so contended. 
(3) The rule u·nder California decisi·ons. 
In Ball.ard L Pacific Greyhound Lines, 170 P. (2d) 
-:1:65, -:1:67, the Supreme Oourt of California stated: 
'· * * * All presumptions are in favor of the 
order and it will be affirmed if it is sustainabl~e 
on any ground. ~Iazzotta v. Los Angeles R. Corp., 
25 Cal. 2d 165, 169, 153 P. 2d 338, and cases cited. 
The trial court in considering a motion for new 
trial is not bound by a conflict in the evidence, and 
has not abused its discretion when there is any 
evidence which would support a judgment in favor 
of the moving party. In re Estate of Green, 25 
Cal. 2d 535, 542, 154 P. 2d 692 ; Hames v. Rust, 
14 Cal. 2d 119, 124, 92 P. 2d 1010. The only con-
flict may be the opposing inferences deducible 
from uncontradicted probative facts. In such 
case the trial court may draw inferences oppos·ed 
to those accepted by the jury and may thus resolve 
the conflicting inferences in favor of the moving 
party, for 'It is only wher·e it can be said as a 
matter of law that there is no substantial evidence 
to support a contrary judgment that an appellate 
court will revers·e the order of the trial court.' '' 
In McCoy v. Yellow Cab Co. of Califorwia, 198 P. 
(2d) 371, 377, the Court stated: 
''The motion for new trial was granted as to 
the respondents Furlong on the ground of insuf-
ficiency of the evidence to support a verdict 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
32 
against them. An examination of the record as 
to their participation in the collision, briefly 
shown in the foregoing resume, discloses evidence 
to the effect that the Furlong car was half way 
through the intersection when the Yellow cab 
reached the westerly curb line of Beechwood as it 
entered the intersection. Since this would tend 
to support a verdict in favor of the respondents 
Furlong, the order granting a new trial will not 
be disturbed. Ballard v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 
supra.'' 
In the case of Potts v. Laos, (Wash.) 200 P. (2d) 
505, 508, the Court stated: 
''Where the order granting a motion for a 
new trial is general and does not specify the 
ground or grounds upon which it was based, the 
inquiry of this court is limHed to the determina-
tion of the ques'tion whether the evidence was suf-
ficient to take the case to the jury. * * * 
"In such oase, wnless we oan say that the ver-
dict ·Of the jury was, as a matter of law, the ·only 
verdict that covuld be rendered, the orde.r gr:arntimg 
the new trial must be affirmed. Henry v. Larsen, 
sw?pro. 
* * * * 
''The trial courts have wide discretion in 
granting or refusing to grant new trials, and the 
exercise of this discretion in granting a new trial 
will not be interf,ered with except in situations 
where only questions of law are involved. Cor-
haley v. Pierce County, 192 Wash. 688, 74 P. 2d 
993; ·* * * 
''Wher-e the evidence upon a material issue 
in a case is conflicting, but sufficient to take the 
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case to the jury, and there are no purely legal 
questions involved, it is within the sound discre-
tion of the trial court to grant or deny a motion 
for new trial, and the ruling of the court on such 
motion will not be interfered with unless it is 
clear, from the record, that the court has abused 
its discretion. ~\hrens v. Anderson, supra, and 
cases therein cited. 
"A much stronger shou·ing of abuse of dis-
cretion will ordinarily be required to set ,aside ,an 
order gtranting a new trial than one denying a 
new trial. Ahrens v. Anderson, supra, and cases 
therein cited.'',. 
In the case of Burke Greis Co. v. Ballard, (Okla.) 
193 P. (2d) 582, 585, the Court stated: 
" 'It is not incumbent upon a trial court to 
render a judgment in accordance with every ver-
dict of a jury. The trial court performs an essen-
tially solemn function in the furtherance of jus-
tice. It must not be forgotten that it is an unyield-
ing and obligatory duty of the trial court to car,e-
fully weigh the entire judicial proceedings, which 
have occurred throughout the trial, and, unless 
the verdict of the jury meets the responsive and 
affirmative approval and conscience of the court, 
it should not stand, and the same should be set 
aside and a new trial granted.' 
'' ~The Supreme Court will not trevers~e the 
ruling of the trial court grant'ing a new trial unless 
it can be seen beyond all reasonable doubt that t:he 
trial court has manifestly arnd mater1ially erred 
wi.th respect to some pure, simple, and ~unmixed 
questions of law, and that excBpt fo.r such error 
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the ruling of the trial cowrt would, not have been 
s:o made. The Supreme Court will very seldom 
and very reluctantly reverse the decision or order 
of the trial court which gronts a new trial.' " 
In Stone v. Los Angeles County Flood Contro·l Dist., 
(Cal.) 185 P. ( 2d) 396, 398, the Court stated: 
''If the evide(Jit(;e is uncontr,a~t1ed a trial 
judge may nevertheless draw inferences from it 
opposed to those drawn by the jury and it is only 
when, as a matter of Zaw, there is no substantVal 
evidenoe to· support a judgment cont{f'ary to the 
verd,iCJt of the jury that an app·eUate court will 
reverse the order granting a new trial. Brooks 
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 27 Cal. 2d 305, 307, 
163 P. 2d 689; Williams v. Field Transportation 
Co., 28 Cal. 2d 696, 698, 171 P. 2d 722.'' 
In the case of MacEenzie v. Angle, (Cal.) 186 P. 
( 2d) 30, 32, the Court stated : 
'' * * * In the latter cas·e the court said that 
where there appears to be reasonable or even fair-
ly debatable justification therefor, an order grant-
ing a new trial will not be set aside although a 
contrary order might not be disapproved or the 
appellate court might be inclined to take a dif-
ferent view." 
(B) THE TRIAL COURT EXERCISED SOUND 
AND JU8T DISCRETION IN GRANTING PLAIN-
TIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW T'RIAL. 
In this phase of respondent's brief it will be our pur-
pose to make a careful review of the evidence to reve·al 
to this Court: 
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(a) That the jury's verdict of No Cause of Action 
resulted in a graYe miscarriage of justice; and 
(b) That plaintiff':;; charges of negligence were 
supported by the great weight of evidence; and 
(c) That the jury's verdict was contrary to the evi-
dence and undisputed facts. 
For the convenienee of the Court we have attached 
to this brief a map, prepared by a Civil Engineer, taken 
from the Timetable introduced in this case as Exhibit 
'' 3' '. This map shows the location of the various sta-
tions, sidings and spurs on the Goshen Branch and o'ther 
pertinent information with reference to mileage, all as 
revealed by the evidence and the exhibits in this case. 
This action was brought under the provisions of the 
Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A., Sections 
51 et seq., which provides, as far as material here, as 
follows: 
''Sec. 51. Every common carrier by rail-
road while engaging in commerce between any of 
the several states * * * shall he liabl~e in damages 
:~~: * * in case of the death of such employee, to his 
personal representative, for the benefit of the sur-
viving widow * * * and children of such employee; 
* * * for * * * death resulting in whole or in part 
from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, 
or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any 
defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in 
its * * * track, roadbed, * * * or other equipment.'' 
"Sec. 53. In all actions hereafter brought 
against any such common carrier by railroad un-
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der or by virtue of any of the provisions of this 
chapter to recover damages for personal injuries 
to an employe•e, ·or where such injuries have re-
sulted in his death, the fact that the employee may 
have been guilty of contributory negligence shall 
not bar a recovery, but the damages shall be dim-
inished by the jury in proportion to the amount 
of negligence attributable to such employee: * * *" 
In submitting the cause to the jury, the Court in its 
Instruction No. 1 (R. 103) set forth the issues on liability 
as follows: 
'' 1. In that it failed to furnish said decedent 
a reasonably safe place to work when it required 
him to perform the duties of his employment from 
the platform of the caboose as said caboose was 
being shoved along over the railroad tracks of the 
defendant immediately prior to and at the time of 
the occurrence of said accident. 
'' 2. In that def·endant failed to furnish, in-
stall and maintain an adequate, secure and proper 
safety chain and hook across the opening to the 
rear of the platform of the caboose where de0edent 
was stationed and working, at and immediately 
prior to the occurrence of said accident. 
'' 3. In that defendant used an unsa£e method 
and practice in making up its train and moving 
it over said Goshen Branch Line in this, in that it 
caused the boxcar then and there being used as a 
caboose to be coupled to the pilot ·end of the engine 
and shoved along ahead of the train thereby sub-
jecting said decedent to unnecessary hazards. 
'' 4. That defendant failoed to furnish dece-
dent with a safe place to perform the labors and 
duties incident to his employment, in that it re-
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quired hin1 to work upon a platform located on 
the leading end of UP car No. 05706. That due 
to the size. weight, and construction of said car it 
had a tendency to, and did sway from side to side 
and pitch up and down when being shoved along 
said railroad tracks, and that as a result of that 
condition decedent's place of work was hazardous 
in that his footing on said platform became and 
was insecure and unstable as said car was being 
shoved along the tracks approaching the point 
where said accident occurred.'' 
By its verdict of No Cause of Action the jury ab-
solved the defendant of all negligence and placed the full 
responsibilit:~ for the fatal accident upon the deceased. 
In granting plaintiff's motion for new trial, the Court 
declared (R. 179) : 
''The motion for a new trial in the above-
entitled action having heretofore been made by the 
above-named plaintiff and submitted to the Court 
after arguments thereon, both oral and written, 
and the Court being fully advised in the premis·es, 
said motion for new trial is hereby granted. 
''The Jury by its verdict absolved the de-
fendant of all negligence which was a proximate 
caus·e of the injuries to and death of the decedent. 
It did this despite the uncontroverted evidence 
(1) that the caboose from which the decedent fell 
was being propelled ahead of the locomotive and 
of the train, thereby rendering such an accident 
as caused the death of the deceased possible; and 
(2) that the safety chain mentioned in the evi-
dence was inadequate, at least that when it was 
put to the test it failed to perform the function 
for which it was intended. 
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''The motion for new trial therefore is grant-
ed primarily on the grounds stated in Paragraph 
8 of plaintiff's Notice of Intention to move for a 
New Trial, and also upon the general grounds set 
forth in Section 104-40-7 Utah Code Annotated, 
1943. There was no doubt a misapprehension, or a 
disregard, on the part of the Jury either of the 
evidence, or of the Court's instructions, or of 
both." 
The evidence will be discussed und,er several perti-
nent sub-headings. 
(1) DEFENDANT MADE UP ITS TRAIN WITH THE 
CABOOSE AHEAD OF THE ENGINE WITH FULL KNOW-
LEDGE OR MEANS OF KN.OWLEDGE THAT IN SO DOING 
IT THEREBY SUBJECTED ITS BRAKEMEN TO UNUSUAL 
AND UNNECESSARY DANGER AND HAZARD. 
Defendant placed the caboose upon which deceased 
was working at the time of his death ahead of the engine, 
knowing that its brakemen would be required to perform 
their duties upon the platform of the caboose as it was 
being sho¥ed along in front of the train over the Goshen 
Branch line track. 
The train was made up by the defendant with the 
caboose at the head of the train under the direction and 
with the approval of Conduetor Freeman. 
When the crew came to work on the morning of the 
28th of October, 1947, the train, already made up, was 
in readiness. The crew brought the ,engine out of the 
roundhouse and coupled it onto the train (R. 327). The 
caboose at that time was coupled to the rear of the train 
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(R. 329). When the crew returned from midday lunch 
the train to be taken out was made up and ready for 
departure. The rear sixteen cars were loaded with beets, 
ahead of the loads were ten empty coal cars ; the engine 
was coupled on ahead of the empties, and the caboose 
under the direction of Freeman, the Conductor, was. cou-
pled onto the front or pilot end of the engine (R. 334). 
Freeman testified (R. 665) that as conductor he was 
in charge of the train crew and was responsible for the 
operation of the train; that he directed the train's move-
ment and the work and activities of the t)rain crew. At 
R. 679 he stated that he wanted the caboose placed ahead 
of the engine and that whether it was placed ahead 
of the engine or at the rear of the train was a matter 
entirely within his discretion; and at R. 708-9-10 that if 
he had desired to place the caboos.e at the rear end of 
the train he would have done so. 
Croft, who was working with Jorgensen at the time 
of his death, testified that he had worked on the Goshen 
Braneh beet job during fifteen seasons and that the de-
fendant customarily shoved the caboose ahead of the 
engine (R. 325, 326). .At R. 334 he testified that the yard 
force in making up the trains always asked whoever was 
in charge of the train where they wanted the caboose 
and that this was done in making up the train which the 
crew took out on the afternoon of the fatal event. 
He testified that the proper way to make up a train 
was to place the caboose at the rear (R. 460). 
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Fenton Wilson, a switchman of six years experience 
in the Idaho Falls yard, testified that it was part of his 
duties to make up trains in the yard and that the c:aboose 
should be at the rear of the train (R. 511), and that 
switchmen making up trains in the yards customarily 
placed the caboose at the rear unless otherwise ordered 
(R. 512). 
Croft t·estified that in his opinion the train was not 
made up properly on the day of the fatal accident be-
cause ''it could have be·en made up the way it should 
have been made up with the caboose at the rear" (R. 
387). 
Freeman, Conductor, testified-that in his experience 
as a conductor it had been the custom and was the safest 
to have the caboose at the rear of the train (R. 677). 
At R. 387, Croft testified: 
'' Q. There nev·er is a time when it is proper to 
have the c:aboose at the head of the engine, 
is that what you want to say~ 
A. Yes sir." 
J. E. Brown, a qualified expert, testified as follows 
(R. 573). 
'' Q. When do you place a caboose in head of a 
train~ 
A. Only in wo~k train service. 
Q. Only in work train service~ 
A. That is all. 
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Q. In your twenty-se,·en years of experience, did 
you eYer know of a caboose to be used con-
tinuously ahead of the train~ 
~-\... N" o sir." 
We submit that a brakeman required to perform his 
duties while stationed upon the front platform of a 
caboose being propelled along at the head of a moving 
train is thereby subjected to dangers and hazards far 
greater than if his place of work (the caboose platform) 
were on a caboose attached to the rear of the train. The 
mere statement of this fact should supply its own proof. 
It seems apparent that if a brakeman fell or was jerked 
off a moving train while stationed on the platform of a 
trailing caboose, there would be a much greater likeli-
hood of survival, than if he were jerked or fell forward 
from the platform of a caboose being shoved along ahead 
of the train. The latter event would most certainly re-
sult in fatal injuries as it did here. However there was 
evidence on this point. 
Croft testified that requiring a brakeman to ride on 
the front end of a caboose as it was being shoved along 
the line was more hazardous to a man than dropping 
cars (R. 469). 
Brown stated that in his opinion brakemen required 
to perform their duties on the platform of a caboose 
being shoved along ahead of a train might fall or be 
jerked off by any sudden stop, jerk or train sway and 
that it would be more dangerous to fall from the front 
of a caboose being shoved ahead of the train than to 
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fall from the platform of a trailing caboose (R. 564), 
for the reason that a fall from a trailing caboose might 
result in injury, but a fall from the platform of a caboose 
being shoved ahead would most certainly result in death, 
( R. 566-67) . 
(2) THERE WAS NO NECESSITY OR REASON FOR 
PLACING THE CABOOSE AHEAD OF THE TRAIN AND IN 
MAKING UP AND OPERATING ITS TRAIN, AS IT DID, 
DEFENDANT VIOLATED ITS OWN OPERATING RULE 
802 (J). 
Rule 802 ( J) ( R. 355) provided : 
''Cars must not he handled ahead of engine 
between stations, except when necessary to take 
cars to or from a spur or in work train service 
and the movement then must be for no greater 
distance than necessary.'' 
The evidence clearly reveals that the train, upon 
which Jorgensen was working when killed, was improper-
ly made up; that there was no necessity for placing the 
caboose at the front of the train thus requiring Jorgensen 
to perform his duties while statinned on the platform 
at the leading ·end of the caboose; and that in so doing 
defendant violated its Operating Rule 802 (J). 
The train upon which Jorgensen was working when 
killed had been made up by the yard switchmen accord-
ing to the desir·es of the conductor. There was no switch-
ing to do at any station after delivering the sixteen loads 
of beets at Orvin and Lincoln Junction (R. 336). 
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Croft testified that the ten en1pty cars coupled to 
the rear of the engine were all to be set out at Indian 
and that they had no orders for any work beyond Indian, 
that there were no loads to pick up. He had seen the 
orders referred to (R. 333). The siding at Indian was 
clear that day and after the empties were set out at 
Indian the train and crew were to return to the factory 
(R. 336). 
Prior to the occurrence of the fatal accident the 
caboose had been shoved along ahead of the train from 
Idaho Falls to Orvin, from there to Lincoln Junction, 
from Lincoln Junction to Wilkinson, and from Wilkinson 
to Ammon, and from Ammon to the point where Jorgen-
sen was killed (R. 355-56). See map attached hereto. 
He testified that even though there had been cars 
to pick up beyond Indian it would not be necessary or 
helpful to have the caboose ahead of the engine. After 
a hammering cross examination he again reiterated that 
there were no cars at Cox that afternoon, and stated 
that even so, the caboose should have been at the rear 
of the train and that the necessity of picking up cars at 
Cox, if such existed, could not have been expedited in 
any way by handling the caboose ahead of the train. 
At R. 467 and 469 Croft testified definitely that if 
the caboose had been at the rear of the train no extra 
switching movements whatsoever would have become nec-
essary. 
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He testified that there was no necessity of having 
the caboose in front of the engine on the afternoon job on 
the day Jorgensen was killed (R. 3'54). 
Croft also testified at R. 378-79-80-81, that he did 
not figure they were in work train service that afternoon 
and that "we weren't doing a regular service a work 
train would be doing, and we were handling commercial 
stuff," and at (R. 356) : 
'' Q. On this afternoon job that you were perform-
ing when Jorgensen was killed, were you mov-
ing any cars at all between spurs 1 
A. No, not this day. 
Q. On this day was the train that you were 
handling a train in work train service~ 
A. No, we wer,en't doing work train work. We 
were working with working orders, but not 
doing work train work." 
At R. 470 he testified that the only work the train 
crew did on this Branch line was to take out empty cars 
from Idaho Falls and place them on the spurs and sidings 
as r,equired and take loaded cars off the spurs and sidings 
and haul them into the yards at Idaho Falls on the return 
trip. 
Freeman testified that there was no switching opera-
tion to be performed by the train crew between Lincoln 
Junction and Indian. His testimony is int,eresting, and 
we quote (R. 679): 
'' Q. Now, on this trip from Indian-or from Lin-
coln Junction to Indian on which the accident 
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occurred, there was no switching operation, 
was there'? 
A. None this day, no. 
Q. State whether or not there was any need, for 
the switching operations, to have the caboose 
on the front of the engine~ 
A. I wanted it there. 
Q. "\Yell, yes, and it's discretional with you, as 
I understand it~ 
A. It is. 
Q. I believe you indicated that on occasions you 
had it in front of the engine so that it would 
expedite switching operations~, 
A. That's right. 
Q. But in this instance, just prior to the acci-
dent, there was no switching operation neces-
sary between Lincoln Junction and Indian, 
was there~ 
A. No." 
.And further (R. 703): 
'' Q. Did I understand you to say that there was 
nothing wrong with the caboose being in 
front of the engine, for switching purposes 1 
A. The~e was nothing wrong with it being there. 
Q. For switching purposes1 
A. Yes. That's what I had it there for. 
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Q. And is th~t the o~ly reason you had it th~ref 1t 
A. That's one reason, yes. 
Q. Well, isn't that the only reason f 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. The tracks where you were operating this day 
were such that the caboose could have been 
placed on the rear of the train; isn't that 
true? 
A. Could have been." 
(R. 706): 
"Q. Mr. Freeman, you indicated that having the 
caboose on the front end of the engine assist-
ed in dropping cars; that's true, isn't iU 
A. Don't assist in dropping them, but it's in the 
proper place when they are on the head end. 
Q. Now, there were no cars to be dropped be-
tween Lincoln Junction and Indian, were 
there~ 
A. No cars to be dropped at that-No, not that 
I knew of. 
Q. That's right. So that it didn't-having the 
caboose on the front end didn't assist you in 
your proper operation of your train, and 
switching movements, between Lincoln Junc-
tion and Indian~ 
* * * 
Q. State whether or not it gave you any assist-
ance, between those two points, in having it 
on the front~ 
A. I will say no." 
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~-\.t (R. 673) Freeman testified: 
"'Q. Your next movement was to go down to 
Indian1 
A. Yes sir. 
* * • 
Q. There was no switching to be done between 
Lincoln and Indian 1 
A. No, didn't anticipate any.'' 
It thus clearly appears that when the train left Idaho 
Falls the crew knew that there were no cars to be placed 
on any of the spurs, and if there had been cars to place 
on these spurs it would have been necessary to drop 
them in because all of the cars were behind the engine. 
The conclusion is irresistible that no switching move-
ment was expedited, aided, assisted or made less difficult 
by having the caboose ahead of the engine, and therefore 
in making up the train the defendant violated its own 
Rule 802 (J), subjected Jorgensen to unnecessary haz-
ards, which materially and substantially contributed to 
- the cause of his death. 
THE DEFENDANT'S DEFENSE AGAINST ITS VIOLA-
TION OF ITS OWN OPERATING RULE 802 (J). 
This rule provides ( 1) ''Cars must not be handled 
ahead of engine between stations", with the following 
exceptions (a) except when necessary to take cars to or 
from a spur. No contention was made in this case that 
there existed any necessity whatsoever of taking cars to 
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or from a spur or from spur to spur. When the train left 
Idaho Falls it had no cars in it which were to be placed 
on any spur, nor were there any cars to remove from 
any of the three spur tracks; (b) ''or in work train serv-
ice'' with the following limitation ''and the movement 
then must be for no greater distance than necessary." 
The caboose was intentionally placed at the forefront of 
the train, and there was no reason or necessity for so 
placing it. The railroad contends that Jorgensen's train 
was a work train and that it was in work train service, 
and by ignoring the limitation ("and the movement then 
must be for no greater distance than necessary''), seeks 
to justify violation of Rule 802 ( J). 
Most of the record made by the defendant was in 
its attempt to build up two "strawmen". Defendant, to 
justify its violation of the rule attempted to show (1} 
that shoving the caboose ahead of the car was less dan-
gerous than a drop and that it was so placed to save a 
drop, but the record is clear as herein set forth, that 
no drop was saved nor eliminated on this day inasmuch 
as all of the cars brought out of Idaho Falls were behind 
the engine. Therefore placing the caboose at the head of 
the train could not and as matter of fact did not save or 
eliminate a drop. 
Disregarding for the moment the limitation of the 
right to move cars ahead of the engine "in work train 
service'' i.e., ''the movement then must be for no greater 
distance than necessary", let us examine the evidence 
as to whether or not this was a work train. 
:J 
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In some instances railroad counsel referred to the 
train as ·'a roving s"itch engine'' and other instances 
as "a work train." It was neither. It was a branch line 
train which handled nothing but commercial freight, and 
in so doing, delivered empties to be loaded with such 
freight, and performed necessary switching operations 
at the various sidings and spurs. 
Defendant at page 3 of its brief describes the opera-
tion of this train in language which we adopt as being 
fair and accurate. 
'' * * * Operations on this line are seasonal 
and involve the setting out of empty cars at the 
above named stations and picking them up and 
returning them to Idaho Falls or Lincoln when 
they are loaded. The traffic is principally in 
beets, some pot a toes, and pumice stone which is 
picked up at one station, Indian, and the opera-
tion is referred to as the Lincoln beet job. The 
Utah-Idaho Sugar Company maintains a factory 
at Lincoln. The job was set up September 22, 
1947 and traffic such as indicat,ed above was han-
dled until January 10, 1948, at which time the 
service was discontinued. It is a daily operation, 
including Sundays, once it starts and the deceased 
had worked every day from the time the job was 
set up, September 22, 1947, until the day of the 
accident.'' 
Defendant seemed to contend that the orders under 
which the train operated made of it a train ''in work 
train service." Although these orders were in the pos-
session of the defendant and could have been produced 
for examination by the Court and jury, it did not see fit 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
50 
to exhibit them. The only testimony on that is certain 
illusory suggestions contained in the testimony of Free-
man. 
Croft testified that when he bid the job in it was 
billed on the Bulletin with an ordinary tie-up at Idaho 
Falls, that there was nothing on the Bulletin to indicate 
that the train was a work train; that it was not bul-
letined as a work train or an extra, hut as a "beet train," 
( R. 466-67). 
Brown testified with reference to the distinction be-
tween work trains and work train service (R. 572, 573) 
as follows: 
''Q. What is a work train~ 
A. Well, it is according to how your train orders 
are issued to you. 
Q. Just describe a work train, so a jury might 
visualize it. 
A. A work train is a train assigned to gather 
company material, or to do other company 
work. 
Q. What kind of work~ 
A. Such as laying rails, unloading ties, spread-
ing of ballast, or what we call 'ditching with 
a clam shovel' or 'ditcher', a ~egular ditcher, 
or scoop di tcher. 
Q. Did you ever know of a work train being as-
signed to do regular switching operations in 
stations up and down a line~ 
A. No, sir, I have never been on one." 
0 
II!~ 
liS! 
m~~ 
~1 
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And at R. 573, 57-!, as follows: 
•' Q. You have heard of work trains, and you have 
also heard of work train service, haven't you~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you have heard of trains operating 
lmder work train service orders, haven't you~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you have heard of trains operating un-
der those orders where they were not doing 
company work, haven't you~ 
A. \Yell, no. 
Q. Never have~ 
A. They don't give you that kind of a train 
order." 
Baker, the defendant's Trainmaster, on cross ex-
amination, testified that local trains usually handle com-
- mercialloads and that to his individual knowledge there 
was nothing handled on the Goshen Branch except com-
mercial loads of beets, potatoes and pumice stone. In 
answer to the question : 
'' Q. What other work did that train ever do or 
perform except the work necessarily incident 
to handling that freight on the Goshen 
Branch~ 
* * * 
A. They would have to do what is called work at 
Lincoln Junction and that would he incidental 
work at the factory, spotting coal and spot-
ting for beets." (R. 782) 
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That the only right of way maintenance work they could 
ever do would be to perhaps deliver gravel or cinders 
where needed. He testified (R. 783): 
'' Q. Do they have any other work to do except 
move empties, and except, of course, to move 
loads of potatoes, beets, and pumice stone 1 
A. Not except we have to have a load of cinders 
or gravel. 
Q. That is local, they might handle that~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Then, the work is similar1 
A. It is similar, yes, sir.'' 
In describing the work train, Baker testified (R. 786) : 
"Q. Are they ever sent out to replace ballast? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And haul out ties, replace ties 1 
A. Take out for delivery, and pick up, as they 
are loaded. 
Q. Now, these work trains are slow moving 
trains, aren't they~ 
A. Yes, ordinarily. 
Q. They move from place to place slowly 1 
A. That is right. 
Q. They have a lot of men in the outfit 1 
A. Yes, they would have them. 
Q. That is right 1 
A. That is right. 
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Q. And it is in trains like that that it is permis-
sible to handle the caboose ahead of the train; 
isn't that right~ 
.\. It would be of that nature. 
Q. And, as you have said, the rule refers to work 
train service and not work train orders ; is 
that right~ 
A. That is right." 
With reference to Rule 802 (j) and its prohibition 
against handling cars ahead of the engine between sta-
tions, he admitted that the following stations were on 
the Branch line between Idaho Falls and Indian: Orvin, 
Lincoln Junction, Wilkinson, Ammon, Hackman and 
Indian, and that all of the stations were so listed in the 
Time-Table. 
With respect to that portion of the rule which states: 
'' * * * except when necessary to take cars to 
or from a spur * * * and the movement then must 
be for no greater distance than necessary.'' 
The witness admitted that it could be complied with 
even though a car was ahead of the train when the train 
reached the first siding. 
The witness, at R. 798, admitted that a train regu-
larly assigned, which operated on a schedule, would not 
be a work train. 'He likewise admitted that an extra train 
might be designated as a work extra whether it was i!n. 
work train service or not. 
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(3) JORGENSEN'S PLACE OF WORK, THE PLAT-
FORM ON THE LEADING END OF THE MAKESHIFT 
CABOOSE AS IT WAS BEING PROPELLED ALONG, WAS 
DANGEROUS, HAZARDOUS AND UNSAFE. 
The car supplied by defendant to its crew for use 
as a place to work and where Jorgensen was working 
when he lost his life, was a large automobHe car which 
had been remodeled into a makeshift caboose. (R. 339). 
Exhibit "A" is a side view of the car. Exhibits 
''B'', ''C'' and ''I'' are rear view pictures. ·l 
At this point we desire to call the Court's attention 
to photographs (Exhibits "D", "E" and "F") which >1 
depict the tracks at and in the vicinity of the point where :;~ 
Jorgensen was killed. (R. 363). ~j 
It was much larger in length and height than an 
ordinary standard caboose and was being used on the 
job when Croft went to work September 22nd (R. 341). 
It had no cupola (R. 345). 
It was, to use a word of Freeman, a "rough rider" 
and swayed and pitched as it was being moved along 
over the Goshen Branch Line tracks. 
In describing its riding qualities Croft testified that 
it was an awful hard, rough rider and that it rode rough 
both on main line and branch line tracks. He testified In 
that he had ridden it over the main line tracks between :~rio1 
Idaho Falls and Pocatello at the approximate speed of -''1€lll( 
forty miles an hour and that under these conditions it ~nll! 
·~e~ 
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was ahnost impossible ''to stand on your feet in the 
caboose" without being thrown off balance (R. 342-3). 
Croft likewise stated that the Goshen Branch line 
tracks were not maintained as well as the main line 
tracks and that while it was being moved over the Goshen 
Branch line tracks a brakeman "would have to hold onto 
anything he could get his hands on'' or he would lose 
his balance, and that the caboose had a lot of swayini, 
and bouncing up and down (R. 343). He testified that 
it was impossible to write while in the caboos-e (R. 344). 
On cross examination he testified that when riding 
the caboose a brakeman "don't just stand there"-that 
he would want to hold onto something (R. 422). F'rom 
the Record, 422, we quote : 
'' Q. I see. You weren't holding onto the grab 
iron because of the rough riding of the ca-
boose, were you 1· 
A. This special caboose, yes, sir. 
Q. You say you were~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
• * * 
It was a rough rider and you had to hang 
on." (R.423). 
In a most interesting cross ·examination, Croft fully 
described and demonstrated the swaying and pitching 
movement of this caboose. We believe this cross examin-
ation under leading and suggestive questions by railroad 
counsel, who presumably was well acquainted with all the 
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facts in the case, would be most instructive and helpful 
to the Court. (It will he recalled that the cross examiner, 
Mr. Leverich was on the tracks where Jorgensen was 
killed with other company officials and a photographer 
on March 11, 1947, when the movie (Ex. "4") was made, 
(R. 761, 770). Mr. Leverich's likeness does not appear 
in any of the moving pictures. It is therefore assumed, 
that he was in the so-called caboose, while the moving 
pictures were being made. At least he was in a position 
to observe the movements at first hand. He was there 
for that purpose. If this assumption is correct, he was 
peculiarly well fitted by his own experiences to lead this 
witness, who, like the examiner, was a company employee.) 
For that reason the examination is set forth in full here-
in (R. 425-29) : 
"Q. Now, I think you stated to Mr. Black that 
this caboose bumped and swayed and jerked; 
is that right~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Can you describe for us a little how much 
bumping-, or, first, let me ask you, what do 
you mean by bumping, up and down~ 
A. An up and down movement~ 
Q. An up and down movement~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What do you mean by 'swaying'~ 
A. The caboose was swaying from one side to 
the other. 
Q. What do you mean by 'jerking'~ 
A. And 'jerking' would be back and forth. 
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Q. The same as swaying~ 
A. Only a different direction. 
Q. By 'swaying', you mean from side to side; is 
that right? 
A. From side to side. 
Q. ''l1at do you mean by 'jerking'~ 
A. A back and forth movement. 
Q. A forward and backward movement~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And bumping up and down~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, this car had an awful swaying motion, 
didn't it, Mr. Croft~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. It swayed so bad you couldn't hardly stand 
up on the car, could you~ 
A. That is right~ 
:7 Q. In fact, you had to hold on to everything in 
~! order to even get around in the car; that is 
right, isn't it~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you could hardly sit down in it, even, 
could you, Mr. Croft~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And if you would sit down in it the car would 
sway so much you would be thrown out of 
your seat' 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. You have been thrown out of your seat on 
many occasions, on this car, haven't you, Mr. 
Croft? 
A. I wouldn't say many occasions. 
Q. Have you ever gone to the steps on the side 
of the caboose when it was in motion, and 
looked backward or forward from that posi-
tion? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And it was swaying the same as you have 
described it now, on those occasions; that is 
right, isn't it 1 
A. Yes, sir, that is right. 
Q. And it would throw you right off the side of 
the caboose, would it not, Mr. Croft 1 
A. It would if you wouldn't hold on. 
Q. If you would hold on, it wouldn't! 
A. That is right. 
Q. Now, do you have a judgment, Mr. Croft,-as 
to how much swaying motion there would be, 
for instance, on the top of that caboose 1 
A. I don't know just how much. 
Q. Your best judgment? 
A. Well, it swayed, and if you we~e up ahead of 
this caboose where you could see it, it swayed 
so much it looked like it would turn over. 
Q. Do you have a judgment in feet Y 
A. Oh, I don't know just for sure how many feet 
it would be. 
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Q. Well, do you have a judgm·ent about it, Mr. 
Croft. I don't want you to be exact. I know 
you can't. How far would it go to one side, 
and how far would it go to the other side~ 
A. It would sway so if you were riding up on 
the head end you could see it sway out on both 
sides of the train. 
Q. "\Yhat do you mean by 'head end'~ 
A. If you were riding on the engine. 
Q. If you were riding on the engine, do you have 
a judgment how far it would come out on each 
side! 
A. I would say a foot or two feet. 
Q. You would say a foot or two feet on each side~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That is your best judgment~ 
A. That is my best judgm·ent. 
Q. Now, would that be the top of the caboose, 
Mr. Croft' 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And, by the 'top of the caboose' you mean 
this portion I am pointing to on Exhibit B; 
that is right, isn't itT 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, with respect to the bumping-withdraw 
that. 
I wonder if you can come down and dem-
onstrate to the jury, Mr. Croft, on this sway-
ing motion with your body, if you ean dem-
onstrate how much it would sway' 
A. I can almost explain. 
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Q. I wonder if you would show us Y 
A. Well, walking on the caboose when it is sway-
ing, it keeps you going from side to side on 
the caboose, like this (indicates). 
Q. Suppose you were standing, demonstrate how 
it would go, this way and this way, when you 
were standing~ (Indicates). 
A. Of course, if you were standing still and sway-
ing, it would make your body have a swaying 
motion. 
Q. Illustrate with your body the motion~ 
A. Back and forth (indicates). 
Q. Back and forth, in that manner? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, with respect to the bumping, that is the 
up and down movement~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I wonder if you can describe that a little moTe 
for us?· 
A. This bumping up and down, standing in this 
caboose would make your feet leave the ca-
boose, up and down. 
Q. I see. So that when you were standing in the 
caboose perfectly still, I mean you were per- ;;a 
fectly still, that caboos,e would bump so hard ~ !] 
your feet would leave the floor, is that right 1 
A. That is right. fit 
Q. I wonder if you could demonstrate that down ~~ 
here, Mr. Croft? :a1 
A. This caboose, it is this motion standing there, :!1 
up and down on the front. ,]I 
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Q. About the extent you have indicated Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. \V ould you do that again ; - two or three 
inches! 
~\.. (Indicates). I would say about that. 
Q. ~\.bout two or three inches off of the floor~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. ~ow, with respect to the jerking motion, I 
wonder if you will describe that for us a little 
more¥ 
A. "\V ell, the jerking motion of a car is the for-
ward and backward motion of the car.'' 
(R. 443): 
"Q. Now, as I recall, before we recessed for 
lunch, you stated that the bouncing and the 
swaying might cause a person to lose his foot-
ing, and thereby be thrown off the end of the 
caboose; is that right? 
A. A man could lose his footing, yes.'' 
Croft further testified that while the train was mov-
ing along just prior to Jorgensen's death he was hanging 
on the grab iron because there was always a possibility 
of a man losing his footing if he wasn't holding onto 
something, on account of the movem·ent of the car, and 
that the usual and ordinary motion of the car and the 
swaying motion and bouncing up and down of the car 
could be sufficient to cause a man to lose his balance and 
fall (R. 433). 
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Brown testified, at Record 568, that a brakeman 
working and stationed upon the front platform at the 
leading end of a caboos-e being shoved along ahead of 
the train could well be thrown off by the swaying of the 
car. 
Freeman testified (R. 659) with respect to the bounc-
ing and lateral motion of this caboose while being shoved J 
along over the tracks, and at (R. ·660) that the caboose 
was rigid and that it was almost impossible to write in 
it when moving, and at (R. 683) that "it was more or 
less a bouncing and a lateral motion'' and that he had 
difficulty riding the caboose when it was going over the 
line. He 'testified (R. 683, 684) that he had complained :il 
about the way the caboose rode and had asked the yard- ~;r~ 
master to take it up with the officials and try to get a 
different caboose for him. His testimony on this point 
is as follows (R. 684) : 
"Q. And why did you want a different caboose? 
A. Well, on account of the riding qualities. 
Q. You say in regard to riding qualities. Ex-
plain what you m·ean by that. 
A. Well, the caboose was rigid, and it was im-
possible to write on it when the train was 
moving. 
Q. Anything else t 
A. Well, that was my objections to it. 
Q. And were these requests made prior to this 
accident~· 
A. Yes.'' 
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And at ( R. 685), he testified : 
'' Q. About how many requests did you make for 
them to take it off? 
A. Oh, I would say a couple of times.'' 
In comparing the caboose with the riding qualities 
of a standard caboose Freeman testified: 
''The ordinary cabooses ride a lot smoother'' (R. 
712) and that it was ''a harder caboose to write or ride 
in" (R. 713). 
The fact that this makeshift caboose was not equip-
ped with a cupola likewise subjected the brakemen to 
extraordinary and unnecessary hazards. 
At R. 344-45 Croft testified: 
''A. On a regular caboose you have a cupola that 
has windows on the front, ·and side and rear, 
windows all the way around, rather, and you 
sit in this cupola, and we hav·e an air valv·e 
there, and we can set the air on the brakes 
on the train, and you can see almost any direc-
tion from this cupola you want to see. 
* * • 
'' Q. Where would you have been if that caboose 
had been a standard equipped caboose, with 
a cupola~· 
A. We would probably have been in the cupola, 
riding in the cupola, when we have a caboose 
with one.'' 
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Conductor Freeman, at R. 702-703, gave testimony to 
the following effect: 
'' Q. All right. You may state whether or not, had 
you had a caboose with a cupola on it, that it 
would have been the place for Jorgensen and 
Croft to have been in the cupola, instead of 
where they were standing¥ 
A. Well, I would say it would be Croft's duty 
to be in the cupola. 
Q. What about Jorgensen¥ 
A. I don't know that it would be his duty, but 
he could be there, if he wished. Unless he 
would be on the engine.'' 
( 4) THE MAKESHIFT SAFETY CHAIN (EXHIBIT 1) 
WAS INADEQUATE, UNSAFE AND DANGEROUS AND 
DUE TO ITS INSUFFICIENCIES WAS LIKELY TO AND 
DID BECOME DISENGAGED AND FAILED IN ITS FUNC-
TION WHEN PUT TO THE TEST OF USE. 
Exhibit No. "1" was the chain removed from \Jar 
UP 05706 on the 29th day of October, 194 7, by A. L. Say, 
mechanical foreman of the railroad company a:t Ida:ho 
Falls (R·. 612-623). We respectfully submit that the chain 
itself, toge'ther with the part it played in the tragic acci-
dent resulting in the death of Jorgensen, is the very best 
possible evidence of its insufficiency as a safety device. 
We suggest that any simple experiment will reveal the 
ease and great probability of it becoming disengaged at 
a time when human life might depend upon its proper 
functioning as a safety measure. We shall rest our case 
on this matter by an invitation to ·examine Exhibit 1 
]I 
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and by the citation of the testimony with regard to the 
chain, its hook and its purpose and function. 
Freeman, the Conductor, testified with reference to 
the purpose of the safety chain at R. 689: 
'' Q. And what is the purpose of that chain, that 
safety chain~ 
A. \Yell, as the name implies, a safety chain, to 
keep a person from falling out the end ,of the 
caboose.'' 
In comparing the so-called safety chain, Exhibit 1, 
with ordinary chains, Croft said (R. 360) : 
''This chain that was on the caboose was-had 
a smaller hook on than on ordinary chains that 
are on cabooses, had a very short hook end on it.'' 
Croft thought the hook of the chain, which was on 
the caboose when Jorgensen met his death, was about 
half the size of the hook which appears in Exhibit "C" 
(R. 361). 
At R. 471-472, Croft testified that he did not r,egard 
safety chain (Exhibit 1) as being a safe and proper safe-
ty chain because he did not think it had a proper hook 
on it; that the hook was too small, too short, and that it 
\Vas not the usual and ordinary safety chain hook. 'That 
the ordinary safety chain would have a hook about twice 
as long, and he stated on cross examination (R. 449) 
that Exhibit 1 was not a substantial safety chain. 
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He furthe·r testified at (R. 482-483): 
"Q. Now, what differenee does a shorter hook 
make, Mr. Croft, if any? 
A. There would be more possibility for a short 
hook coming out than one which had a longer 
hook on it.'' 
He also testified that he believed the hook on the 
safety chain was of such nature that it could be forced 
out of the hole by anything coming in contact with it, 
and that if something came in contact with the hook it 
would be disengaged ( R. 483). 
Fenton Wilson, a Switchman in the yards at Idaho 
Falls and a brother-in-law of deceased, testified that 
shortly after the accident and before the train had been 
moved, he ·examined and tested the so-called safety chain, 
and stated (R. 515): 
'' Q. Tell the jury what you did to test it,. 
A. I pushed down. on it, and found by pushing 
down in the middle of it, the hook was so short 
it woufJJd come up a fraction and jump out, and 
if you pushed down real fast and hard it 
would jump out. 
Q. What would happen if the chain was struck 
from underneath, a side-swiping motion? 
A. It would come out." 
Wilson further testified at R. 516 that he had never 
seen a safety chain before with a hook on it like the one 
·~ i 
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on Exhibit "1 ", and that in his opinion the chain (Ex-
hibit "1 ") was not a standard safety chain. 
Leo A. vVilliams, the Coroner and Mortician at Idaho 
Falls, testified that he examined the chain at the scene 
of the accident shortly after its occurrence and at R. 
504 testified : 
"Q. N"ow, :Mr. Williams, 'what can you say with 
respect to the ease or difficulty of removing 
the hook from the ring? 
A. Well, it was not difficult to remove. With 
just a simple twist of the hand it could be 
unhooked, without too much of a backward 
motion of the wrist. 
Q. With very slight change of position of the 
hook you could lift it out of the hole; is that 
right? 
A. With just a slight revers·e action of the wrist 
it could be unhooked. 
Q. By Mr. Black: 
A slight reverse action of the wrist? 
A. A slight upward twist of the chain could un-
hook it.'' 
There is some evidence that the chain (Exhibit "1") 
when in place, did not sway downward as far as the chain 
shown in Exhibit "J", and we believe this is true. The 
double link, which forms the permanent attachment to 
the post near the brake wheel as shown in Exhibit "J", 
seems to be longer than the makeshift permanent ring 
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link attachment on Exhibit "1." The hook link on Ex-
hibit" 1" is not so long as the hook link on Exhibit" J". 
However, there are 23 links in the chain (Exhibit "1") 
and only 22 links on the chain shown in Exhibit "J". 
Croff testified, and his evidence was not disputed, 
that immediately after J or gens en fell from the car he 
observed the safety chain and it was hanging down. (R. 
370). 
(5) THE FATAL EVENT WAS PROXIMATELY 
CAUSED BY DEFENDANT'S VARIOUS ACTS OF NEGLI-
GENCE, COMBINED AND CONCURRING. 
Jorgensen was the head brakeman on the local the 
day of his death (R. 328). 
As the train proceeded along the Branch Line Track 
toward Indian, the two brakemen, Jorgensen and Croft, 
were stationed on the front platform of the caboose. The 
conductor was inside the caboose (R. 336-337). The duties 
of the brakemen We're described by Croft as rollows (R. 
345): 
"Q. What were your duties, and Jorgensen's du-
ties, as the tr~ain was proceeding down to-
wards Indian, shortly before he was killed¥ 
A. We had to be on this platform, on this ca-
boose, when crossing ail crossings, there is 
several crossings here, and there is generally 
a lot of livestock out there, from farming com-
munities, and you have to look out for auto-
mobiles and livestock, and anything that 
would obstruct the movement of the train.'' 
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On cross examination at R. 456, Croft testified: 
'' Q. Now, for ~Ir. Jorgensen to perform his du-
ties, it wasn't necessary for him to stand in 
the PQsition you have described, was it~ 
A. 'Yell, he could stand anywhere on that plat-
form to perform his duties.'' 
Freeman, the conductor, testified that one of the 
duties of the brakeman was to keep a lookout back along 
the train as it moved along. At R. 710-11 he testified: 
'' Q. In order to watch the rear portion of the 
train from the caboose, when it was in front, 
what position would the brakeman have to 
take~ 
A. 
Q. 
A . 
Well, he would have to get on the step and 
look back one side or the ·other, either the 
right hand or the left whichever he preferred. 
And he couldn't see to the rear without get-
ting out on the step, could he~ 
No, he would have to look out on the step. 
That's what they are there for." 
As the train proceeded along Jorgensen was stand-
ing near the opening above the coupler, protected by the 
safety chain, and Croft was standing at his right (R. 
347, 348). Jorgensen was operating the tail hose equip-
ment at the leading end of the caboose. This hose was 
used for two purposes: (a) as an air whistle, actuated 
by the manipulation of a small valve, and (h) to set the 
brakes by the m·anipulation of the angle cock (R. 349). 
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Croft testified that when the train was taken out of 
Idaho Falls for the trip down the Branch Line shortly 
prior to Jorgensen's death, he observed the safety chain 
and it was in place. 
With respect to Jorgensen's position just before he 
fell from the train Croft, at R. 4 70-4 71 testified: 
"Q. Was there anything unusual in Jorgensen's 
position the last time you saw him~ 
A. No sir." 
(R. 471-472) : 
''Q. You stated that you had used this tail hose 
from time to time~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And I suppose sounded the air whistle~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And about where would you stand when you 
were operating the whistle and the tail hose 
brake~ 
A. About in the same vicinity. 
Q. Wher.e Jorgensen was standing~ 
A. Where Jorgensen was standing, yes sir.'' 
In describing the speed of the train and its sway-
ing and pitching immediately prior to Jorgensen's death, 
Croft testified at R. 366, 368: 
'' Q. Now, I direct your attention to the move-
ment of this train before Jorgensen lost his 
:t~~ 
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life, and I will ask you to describe, as near as 
you can, the speed the train was traveling at 
that timeT 
.A. Approximately twenty miles an hour. 
Q. \\7hat would you say with respect to the move-
ment, or motion of the so-called caboose, on 
which you men were working at that time 
just before Jorgensen was killed~ 
A. This caboose always had a tendency to sway 
and bounce up and down; in fact, it did that 
all the time, no matter where you had it. 
Q. \Vas it swaying or bouncing just before he 
was killed~ 
A. Yes sir." 
In describing Jorgensen's fall from the train, Croft 
testified (R. 366-8): 
"Q. Just before Jorgensen was killed, what did· 
you dof 
A. I was standing to the right of Jorgensen; we 
were talking just ordinary talk we talked 
every day, and I turned my head and was 
looking out the side of the caboose, arnd I 
heard this commo~t®on, and I turned and I 
could see Brakeman Jorgensen about half 
way between the caboose and the ground. 
Q. Will you describe his fall, in some detail~ 
A. He fBll face forward, with his hands out in 
front of him. It looked like he lit on his hands 
and feet. He fell inside the rails toward the 
left, inside the rails. 
Q. BetwBen the rails~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. Now, desc.ribe ·~he nolise that you designated 
as 'Commotion'? 
A. This noise I hetard was like metal comilng 
ag.ainst metal, is the .noise I heard; that is 
what made me trurn my head. 
Q. While you were on this platform, did you and 
Jorgensen notice the safety chain 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. What position was it in~ 
A. The safety chain was across and in position. 
Q. As I understand, you saw Mr. Jorgensen as 
he was falling down on the rails onto the 
track~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. What did you do¥ 
A. I immediately crossed over to this air valve, 
this air lever, and pulled on the air on the ill train, and as soon as we came to a stop I 
Qmrut walked back to the .engineer and told the engi-
geer, Stoddard, we had run over Wendell. mann 
Q. Go ahead, did you find his body underneath 11'% 
the train~ ~!ol 
A. I asked Mr. Stoddard if he would go back. I mnovl 
didn't immediately go back, and Mr. Stod- (a dard went back to look at the body. ~~a Q. Where, underneath the train was the body, at j~ow]e this time~ 
* * • 
il!nm 
A. We found the body back four or five cars (o 
behind the engine.'' ~~ 
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(R. 370): 
"Q. Did you see it (the safety chain) at any time 
after Jorgensen fellY 
A. The only time I ever saw this chain after Jor-
gensen fell was right after the accident, the 
chain was hanging down, that is the last time 
I saw the chain." 
Also (R. 370-71) : 
'' Q. How far were you from the Lincoln J unc-
tion at the time this accident occurred. 
A. It would be in the vicinity of about ten miles, 
maybe a little over ten miles. 
Q. That would be about ten miles from Idaho 
Falls, wouldn't it Y 
A. Yes sir; about ten miles from Idaho Falls." 
In concluding this phase of our brief we respectfully 
submit that it clearly appears from the admitted facts 
and uncontroverted evidence that the jury by its verdict 
of ''No Cause of Action,'' thereby absolving the defen-
dant of any negligence whatsoever, entirely disregarded 
and overlooked the following facts : 
(a) Defendant made up its train with the caboose 
ahead of the engine with the full knowledge or means of 
knowledge that in so doing it thereby subjected its brake-
men to unusual and unnecessary danger and hazard; and 
(b) There was no necessity or reason for placing 
the caboose ahead of the train and in making up and 
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operating its train, as it did, defendant violated its own 
Operating Rule 802 ( J) ; and 
(c) Jorgensen's place of work, the platform on the 
leading end of the makeshift caboose as it was being pro-
pelled along, was dangerous, hazardous and unsafe; and 
(d) The makeshift safety chain (Exhibit 1) was 
inadequate, unsafe and dangerous and due to its insuf-
ficiencies was likely to and did become disengaged and 
failed in its function when put to the test of use; and 
(e) The fatal event was proximately caused by de-
fendant's various acts of negligence, combined and con-
curring. 
Can it he doubted that the jury disregarded, as the 
trial court stated, the uncontroverted evidence (1) that 
the caboose from which the decedent fell was being pro-
pelled ahead of the locomotive and of the train thereby 
rendering such an accident as caused the death of the 
deceased possible; and (2) that the safety chain (Exhibit 
1) was inadequate, at least that when put to the test it 
failed to perform the function for which it was intended. 
It is submitted that if the uncontroverted evidence 
on the charges of neglect had been given any weight or 
consideration whatsoever by the jury the verdict would 
have been for plaintiff. This evidenoe, so completely dis-
regarded by the jury, demonstrated a cl_ear causal connec-
tion between defendant's neglect as charged and proved 
and decedent's death. 
Ti 
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If the purpose of jury trials is to accomplish a just 
result, if the function of the trial court is to prevent mis-
carriages of justice by the exercise of its wide discre-
tionary power to grant new trials, then there was nothing 
else for the trial court to do except grant, as it did, plain-
tiff's motion for new trial. 
(C) GROUNDS URGED BY PLAINTIFF IN 
THE TRIAL COURT I~ SUPPORT OF HIS l\10TION 
FOR NE\Y TRIAL. 
The following grounds were set forth and urged by 
plaintiff in his motion for new trial (R. 136, 13'7) : 
'' 3. The Court erred in refusing to give to 
the jury certain instructions requested hy plain-
tiff in the manner and form as requested. 
'' 4. Irregularity in the proceedings of the 
Court, the jury and the orders of the Court and 
abuse of discretion by which the plaintiff was pre-
vented from having a fair trial. 
'' 7. Newly discovered evidence material for 
the plaintiff which he could not with reasonable 
diligence have discovered and produced at the 
trial. 
'' 8. That the verdict and judgment are con-
trary to the evidence and against law. 
"9. Error in law occurring at the trial and 
excepted to by the plaintiff. 
'' 10. The Court ought to grant a new trial in 
the exercise of its inherent power to prevent in-
jus'tice and to secure to all litigants a fair and im-
partial trial. ' ' 
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In the presentation of the motion for new trial be-
fore the trial court, plaintiff maintained that the evi-
dence was insufficient to support the verdict; that the 
verdict was against the evidence, and that the verdict 
itself was obviously a grave miscarriage of justice, es-
pecially in view of the Federal Employer's Liability Act 
which makes the carrier liable when its negligence has 
contributed in whole or in part to the cause of injury or 
death. We have fully presented the evidence on that 
matter and will not reargue it here. We are content with 
again suggesting that on the matter of negligence the 
evidence was all one way and that the charges of negli-
gence were supported by the overwhelming weight of 
proof and that the verdict of the jury indicated a com-
plete and total disregard of admitted facts and facts es-
tablished beyond peradventure of doubt by the uncon-
tradicted evidence. 
Several additional grounds were presented in sup-
port of the motion. 
GROUND i. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ER-
ROR BY GIVING INSTRUCTION NO.7 (R. 110). 
The trial court committed prejudicial error in the 
granting and giving of defendant's Request No. 16 (R. 
122) in its Instruction No. 7 (R. 110) and in particular 
that portion of the Instruction which states as follows: 
'' * * * In this connection you are instructed 
that the mere happening of an accident is no proof 
:Hilt 
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of negligence on the part of anyone or evidence 
of the same.'' 
By this instruction important and pertinent facts 
supported by the testimony upon which plaintiff relied 
as establishing negligence on the part of defendant were 
withdrawn from jury consideration. Plaintiff relied upon 
the facts surrounding the occurrence of the accident as 
proof of negligence. The happening of the accident in-
volved the fact that the plain tiff was working upon a 
platform at the forward end of the makeshift caboose 
while it was being propelled along in front of the train 
and that the caboose due to its structure and the condi-
tion of the tracks was swaying and pitching to such an 
extent as to imperil deceased's balance and that while so 
stationed and while so engaged deceased fell to his death 
due to the failure of the safety chain to perform its 
function. 
These facts made up the integral parts of the "hap-
pening of the accident" and still the Court instructed the 
jury that ''the mere happening of an accident is no proof 
of negligence on the part of anyone or evidence of the 
same.'' In view of this instruction it is not so difficult to 
understand why the jury returned the unjust verdict of 
which plaintiff complained. 
We have been unable to find any case where an in-
struction of this kind has ever been approved by an ap-
pellate court in any case remotely resembling the case 
at bar. 
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The law on this point is clearly declared and stated 
in 38 A merioan Jurisprudence beginning at the top of 
page 985, in the following language: 
"While it is true that simply because an ac-
cident has occurred, negligence is not to be pre-
sumed, still, in determining the question of negli-
gence, the fact that an accident has occurred may 
be and should be taken into consideration, in con-
nection with all other facts and circumstances of 
the case, for the purpose of determining whether 
in fact there was negligence. Negligence may be 
inferred from circumstances surrounding the in-
jury, if not from the fact of the injury itself." 
In the footnote at page 985 of 38 Amerioarn Juris-
prudence appears the following supported statement: 
''No general rule can be laid down that the 
mere occurrence of an accident is or is not suffi-
cient prima facie proof of actionable negligence. 
* * * Griffin v. Boston & A. R. Co., 148 Mass. 
143, 19 N. E. 166, 1 L.R.A. 698, 12 Am. St. Rep. 
526. 
''Negligence, like any other fact, may be in-
ferred from the circumstances, and the case may 
be such that though there be no positive proof 
that the defendant has been guilty of any neglect 
of duty, the inference of negligence would be ir-
resistible. Barnowsky v. Helson, 89 Mich. 523, 50 
N. W. 989, 15 L.R.A. 33." 
This Court has without doubt recognized this funda-
mental and controlling proposition. See Lewis v. Davis, 
~I 
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59 Utah 85, 201 P. 861. This Court, at page 864 of 201 P. 
stated: 
'' ~-\. t the close of plaintiffs' evidence defen-
dant moved for a nonsuit, and when all of the 
evidence was submitted moved for a directed ver-
dict. Both motions were denied. Defendant ex-
cepted to both rulings of the court and argues the 
exceptions together. The grounds assigned for 
the nwtion are (1) failure to prove defendant's 
negligence at all; (2) failure to show that defen-
dant permitted gas to leak; ( 3) the evidence shows 
that deceased was guilty of contributory negli-
gence; ( 4) the injury, if caused by failure to pro-
perly care for the generator, was due to the negli-
gence of fellow servants; (5) the evidence fails 
to show the proximate cause of the injury; (6) 
the deceased assumed the risk. The gist of defen-
dant's contention in support of this assignment 
seems to be that there is no definite proof of any 
specific act or omission on the part of defendant 
constituting negligence which was the proximate 
cause of the injury. 
"It is true that no one saw the accident hap-
pen. No one knew just what Mr. Lewis was doing 
when the explosion occurred. No one testified that 
the generator leaked gas, or that the hose was dis-
connected, thereby permitting gas to escape. No 
one saw water and carbide in the tank, or noticed 
the condition of the float. No one saw the genera-
tor so as to see whether it had been taken apart, 
or whether the parts were in place, each perform-
ing its function in the generation of gas. No one 
knows the immediate cause of the explosion, or 
just how Mr. Lewis came to his death. 
''The above propositions, in substance, con-
stitute the basis upon which defendant relies in 
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support of the contention that the court erred in 
denying its motion for nonsuit and directed ver-
dict. 
''In the opinion of the court, under the evi-
dence in the record, the fact that an explosion 
actually occurred is an answer to practically every 
proposition above set forth. If there had been 
no water and no carbide in the generator under 
pressure by means of a float on top and no gas 
leaking or hose disconnected by which gas could 
escape and no contact between the gas and a 
lighted torch or other fire there could have been 
no expJosion, and if there had been no explosion 
Robert Lewis would not have been killed in the 
manner shown by the evidence.'' 
Plaintiff charged defendant with failure to furnish 
Jorgensen a safe place to work. Deceased falling from 
the moving train under the circumstances revealed was 
proper proof of this allegation. Plaintiff charged defen-
dant with originating and following a dangerous and 
unsafe practice in making up its trains and moving them 
over the Goshen Branch Line tracks. Jorgensen's fatal 
fall was proper proof of this. Plainti~ charged that the 
roadbed was maintained in a rough and uneven condi-
tion; that as a result of the condition of the roadbed 
and the structure of the makeshift caboose an unusual 
amount of swaying and pitching of the car resulted and 
that this swaying and pitching subjected men stationed, 
as Jorgensen was, to an extreme and extraordinary haz-
ard. His fatal fall was proof of this fact. 
'nr: 
:.]1' 
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Plaintiff eharged defendant with failure to install 
a safe and adequate safety ehain aeross the opening over 
the coupler at the forward end of the platform. J orgen-
sen 's fatal fall proved this charge. 
Jorgensen's position on the platform, the condition 
of the traek, the swaying movement of the car, the fail-
ure of the safety chain to perform its function, the fact 
of falling are all parts, and necessary parts, of the acci-
dent, but under the Court's instruction these facts, ad-
mitted and proved, were eliminated as having no eviden-
tiary value whatsoever in determining the question of 
negligenee. 
The principle that the accident may be proper proof 
of negligence was clearly recognized by this Court in 
Perriln li. Union Pac. R. Co., 59 Utah 1, 201 P. 405. In 
that case the happening of the accident and the facts sur-
rounding it were found to be entirely sufficient to sup-
port the verdict of the jury favorable to the plaintiff. 
Plaintiff cited in support of its contention on this matter 
the following authorities: Patrick W etter:er v. The At-
chison, Topeka and Sanba Fe Ry. Oo., 277 Ill. App. 275. 
Plaintiff never at any time contended that proof of 
injury was proof of negligence, or that the mere proof 
of the happening of the accident was sufficient evidence 
to take a case to the jury. Plaintiff's eontention was that 
the jury was told that the happening of the accident was 
no evidence of negligence, and that therefore the jury 
was not to take into consideration in their deliberations 
the happening of the accident as in any way aiding them 
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in determining whether negligence on the part of the 
defendant existed. See Orris v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. 
Co., (Mo.) 214 S. W. 125, where this point was discussed 
and illustrated. See also Southern Ry. !Co. v. Smith 
(Ala.) 221 Ala. 273, 128 S. 228. See also Hankims v. Rei-
mers, 86 Nebr. 307, 125 N. W. 516; Paulsen v. McA.v~oy 
Brewing Co., 226 Ill. App. 605, and Grauer v. A.Zabama 
(-Jrea.t Southern R. Co., 209 Ala. 568, 96 S. 915. 
In Hackley v. Southern Pacific Co., (Cal.) 45 P. (2d) 
447, that court held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
was applicable where a brakeman fell to his death from 
a car at the rear end of a train. See also Oettimger v. 
Stewart, 137 P. (2d) 852. 
From the Rackley case at page 452, we quote as 
follows: 
"We do not need to cite authorities to the 
effect that direct proof is not required to show 
a negligent act which leads to an employee's death. 
If such negligent act is established by circumstan-
tial evidence, and if the circumstantial evidence 
justifies an inference of a negligent act upon an 
officer or another employee of the company, the 
finding of the court or jury will not be disturbed. 
We will, however, call attention to the following 
cases: Line v. Erie R. Co. (C. C. A.) 62 F. (2d) 
657; Mulligan v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 104 
S. C. 173, 88 S. E. 445; Hurley v. Illinois Central 
R. Co., 133 Minn. 101, 157 N. W. 1005. 
''Inferences ·and presumptions which may be 
drawn from circumstances surrounding any event 
under consideration are not necessarily destroyed 
·_, I~ 
:;j 
J.~. 
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by opposing testimony, but remain to be consid-
ered by the trial court and jury in reaching a con-
clusion. This court, in the case of Beers v. Cali-
fornia State Life Ins. Co., 87 Cal. App. 440, 262 
P. 380, in an opinion written by ~fr. Justice Hart, 
considered Yery fully the subject of presumptions 
and inferences, and the fact that they remain in 
the case for consideration by the trial court, as 
well as testimony which may tend to overcome 
either an inference or presumption. Other cases 
might be cited supporting the same rule as set 
forth in the Beers Case, supra, but to do so would 
only unnecessarily lengthen this opinion.'' 
In the case at bar plaintiff charged negligence gener-
ally. See paragraph IX subsection (a) (R. 3) which un-
der all the authorities is entirely sufficient as far a.s 
pleading is concerned to present and bring a case under 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. See J esionowski v. 
Bost·on & JJ aine R. R., 329 U. S. 452, 67 S. Ct. 401, 91 L. 
Ed. 416; 21 Negligence Compensation Cases Annot~ated 
(N.S.) 563. 
GROUND II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND IN 
REFUSING TO ADEQUATELY INSTRUCT THE JURY ON 
·- PLAINTIFF'S THEORY OF LIABILITY AS SET FORTH 
AND CONTAINED IN PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED IN-
STRUCTIONS NOS. 3 AND 6 (R. 96, 99). 
Plaintiff charged defendant with the failure to in-
stall and maintain an adequate and sufficient safety 
chain, and 1nuch of the proof was directed to this point. 
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Plaintiff contended that this chain, due to its insuf-
ficiency and inadequacy, failed to perform its function 
when put to the test of ordinary and expected usage and 
that when deceased either leaned or was thrown against 
the chain it became unhooked, thereby causing and per-
mitting him to either fall or be thrown from the forward 
end of the caboose in front of the moving train. 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 6 was a correct 
and accurate statement of the law applicable. At no 
other place in the Court's instructions was the jury ap-
prised of plaintiff's theory. It is true that Instruction 
No. 1 set forth the grounds of negligence upon which 
plaintiff relied for recovery and that a subsequent in-
struction stated that unless plaintiff established one or 
more of the grounds set forth in Instruction No. 1 he 
could not recover. However, such a sketchy recital did 
not fairly, properly or justly present plaintiff's theory. 
Plaintiff was entitled to have his theory set forth clearly 
and concisely in a single instruction. He should not have 
been deprived of that fundamental and inherent right. 
After the instructions of the court had been read to 
the jury, counsel for plaintiff requested the Court to ex-
cuse the jury temporarily for the purpose of permitting 
counsel to present a matter of law to the Court, and after 
the jury had retired, the following statement was made 
by plaintiff's counsel in connection with the Court's re-
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fusal to instruct the jury, as contained in Plaintiff's Re-
quest X o. 6 (R. S-!5) : 
· • ~IR. BLACK: Your Honor, one of the 
most important charges of negligence that was 
Inade in the complaint and in the evidence here 
was in the safety chain. 
·'In our request No. 6 we have requested an 
instruction as follows : 'You are instructed tha;t 
if you shall find by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that defendant failed to furnish, install, sup-
ply and maintain adequate, secure and proper 
safety chain and hook across the opening to the 
rear of the platform of the caboose where decedent 
·was stationed and working at and immediately 
prior to the occurrence of the fatal accident, and 
that such failure to furnish a proper, adequate 
and secure safety chain and hook, if any you shall 
find, proximately caused in whole or in part the 
fatal injuries to decedent, then you should return 
a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against the 
defendant and award damages as in these instruc-
tions set forth.' 
''We expressly urge the Court to grant the 
request in that it has become so important in this 
case, both as a matter of pleading and as a matter 
of proof, we feel that the plaintiff is prejudiced 
by the refusal of the Court to grant the instrue-
tion as we have requested.'' 
In view of the above it cannot be contended that this 
error was not sufficiently and timely called to the at-
tention of the Court. 
The Court not only deprived plaintiff of his right 
to have his theory adequately presented to the jury, but 
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on the contrary instructed the jury (Instruction No. 7, 
R. 110), that the mere happening of the accident was no 
proof of negligence on the part of anyone or evidence 
of the same. Inasmuch as the failure of the chain was 
part and parcel of the happening of the accident, the jury 
was thus advised that the failure of the chain to function 
was no proof of negligence. The result was that under 
the Court's instruction plaintiff failed for the want of 
a proper presentation of his theory even though he had 
proved the inadequacy and insufficiency of the safety 
chain, and the causal connection between the defendant's 
negligence in this regard and the death complained of. 
The plaintiff's theory as set forth in his Request 
No. 6 not having been presented to the jury, the Court's 
Instruction No. 7 had the eff·ect of taking from the jury 
all consideration of the fact that the safety chain failed 
permitting deceased to fall to his death. The jury was 
thus precluded from finding from those circumstances 
that the safety chain was insufficient and inadequate and 
had not properly performed its function and that the 
railroad company was therefore negligent. That either 
party to a lawsuit is entitled to have his theory of the 
case presented in form applicable to the evidence and 
pleadings by proper instruction to the jury is a principle 
of law firmly established in our jurisprudence. 
In Furkovich v. Bilngham Co·al and Lumber Co., 45 
Utah 89, 96, 143 P. 121, the Court stated: 
''A charge should be adapted to the facts and 
circumstances of the case on trial and not merely 
embody a correct abstract legal principle.'' 
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Marti.n.ea.u v. Hanson (Feb. 8, 1916), -17 Utah 549, 
557, 155 P. -132. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant 
appeals. This was a suit upon a promissory note Inade 
by defendant to plaintiff for the sum of $1,750. Error 
was cited by the defendant in the refusal of the court to 
instruct upon defendant's theory of the evidence in the 
case. The court in supporting defendant's contention 
and reversing stated: 
"The court refused defendant's requests to 
charge the jury which were based upon the theory 
that the defendant did not know the financial 
standing of John H. Ear 1, and did not rely upon 
his own jutlgment respecting Earl's ability to pay 
the purchase price, but relied wholly upon the 
statements and representations of the plaintiff in 
that regard which defendant aUeged were false. 
There was, to say the least, some evidence pro-
duced by the defendant in support of his theory 
and averments in his answer, and for that reason 
we think the court should have charged the jury 
upon that phase of the case, if not in the language 
requested by the defendant yet in substance to 
that effect. Without pausing now to set forth the 
charge as given, it is manifest from what has al-
ready been said that it did not sufficiently pre-
sent to the jury either the law applicable to the 
evidence or the defendant's theory of the case. 
In this connection plaintiff's counsel insists that it 
was the defendant's fault that the purchaser did 
not fulfill the terms of his contract, and did not 
pay the purchase price agreed upon. The defen-
dant denied plaintiff's contention in that regard. 
Whether the plaintiff's or the defendant's con-
tention should prevail is a question of fact· for 
the jury, and cannot affect defendant's right to 
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have submitted to the jury his contention or the-
ory of the case that the p1aintiff did misrepresent 
the purchaser's ability to pay for the land, and 
that he was not financially able to pay therefor, 
and that for that reason defendant failed to ob-
tain the purchase price agreed upon.'' 
In Toone v. J.P. O'Neill Canst. Co., (Jan. 16, 1912) 
40 Utah 265, 121 P. 10, 16, this Court stated: 
''Without now passing upon the question 
whether the foregoing instruction was not too 
broad in view of the evidence, we concede that a 
party is entitled to have his case submitted to the 
jury upon the theory of his evidence as well as 
upon the theory of the whole evidence." 
Pratt v. Utah Dight & Traction Co., (Feb. 5, 1918), 
57 Utah 7, 169 P. 868, 869, 870. Action for personal in-
juries alleged to have been sustained by plaintiff while 
attempting to board a car of defendant company on ~fain 
Street in Salt Lake City. On judgment for plaintiff the 
defendant appeals. Defendant cited as error refusal of 
the trial court to grant his instruction to the effect that 
"if the jury find from the evidence that plaintiff's injury 
was not caused by the starting from a position of rest of 
the car of the defendant but was caused by his action in 
attempting to board such car while the same was in mo-
tion, then the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover." 
The court in reversing stated : 
"Each party to a suit is entitled to have his 
theory, when there is evidence to sustain it, sub-
mitted to the jury and the judgment of the jury 
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on the facts tending to support such theory, as-
suming always that there is testimony offered 
to support the same, and this court has so held in 
Hartley Y. Salt Lake City, 41 Utah, 121, 124 Pac. 
522, where, speaking through Straup, J., it is said: 
'' ·There are h\·o parties to a lawsuit. Each, 
on a submission of the case to the jury, is entitled 
to a submission of it on his theory and the law 
in respect thereof. The defendant's theory as to 
the cause of the accident is embodied in the pro-
posed requests. There is some evidence as we 
have shown, to render them applicable to the case. 
That is not disputed. We think the court's refusal 
to charge substantially as requested was error. 
That the ruling was prejudicial and works a re-
versal of the judgment is self-evident and una-
voidable.' 
* * * :II= 
' 'Had the court given either of those instruc-
tions as requested or in substance and effect, we 
should be inclined to hold that the issues presented 
by the defendant's answer was sufficiently called 
to the attention of the jury, and its finding on 
that particular issue sufficiently determined. But, 
as indicated, there is nowhere in the instructions 
any direct or concrete statement instructing the 
Jury that, if they found the facts as claimed by 
the defendant, the plaintiff would not be entitled 
to recover. This, in our judgment, should have 
been done. Where the issues are definite and di-
rect, and testimony is offered in support of the 
different positions taken by the plaintiff and de-
fendant, the court should, by unequivocal and un-
ambiguous instructions, direct the jury's atten-
tion to the issues of fact as thus presented to be 
determined by it, and there seems to be no good 
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reason why such instructions should not have been 
given. Such, in our judgment, was not done by the 
court in its instructions in this case. The requests 
on the part of the defendant were seasonably 
made and were sufficient to direct the court's at-
tention to the theory of the defendant's answer, 
and should have been given, if not in the words as 
submitted or requested, at least in substance and 
effect.'' 
M org·wn v. Bingham Stage Lines Co. et al, (Dec. 13, 
1929) 75 Utah 87, 283 P. 160, 166. Action by plaintiff for 
the wrongful death of one Orson Morgan as a result of 
the alleged negligence of defendant in operation of one 
of its motor buses. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendants 
appeal. There was a conflict in the testimony as to 
whether or not the motor vehicle driven by defendant 
ran into plaintiff at a time when he was crossing the 
street to mount a standing street car. Some of the testi-
mony indicated that the street car was standing, some 
that it was moving at the time of the accident. There 
was evidence which the court found authorized submis-
sion to the jury of the question of defendant's negligence 
in failing to operate the vehicle at a proper and safe liD! 
speed and in failing to keep a proper lookout. The court 
in reversing and granting the new trial discussed the ob-
ligation of the trial court in granting instructions cover-
ing the theory of both parties to the case in the following 
language: 
"A party is entitled to have his case submit-
ted to the jury on the theory of his evidence as 
well as upon the theory of the whole evidence. 
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Toone Y. O'Keill Const. Co., 40 Utah 265, 121 P. 
10; Hartley Y. Salt Lake City, 41 Utah 121, 124 P. 
522, 3:Z:i, and ~liller v. Utah Consol. ThL Co. et al., 
53 Utah 366, 178 P. 771; Pratt v. Utah Light & 
Traction Co., 57 Utah 7, 169 P. 868. 
* * * * 
"Respondent's counsel apparently do not 
contest this rule of law, but they argue these re-
quests were substantially covered, as the court 
found was the case in the cases cited. The court 
in other instructions set forth fully plaintiff's 
theory of the evidence as to the alleged negligence 
on the part of the defendants, but, except as 
pointed out, gave no instructions on defendant's 
theory. 
'' \\TJlile the requests are not models of accur-
acy, we think the defendants were entitled to have 
at least the substance of the same given so as to 
present their theory of the evidence to the jury, 
and that a failure on the part of the court to do so 
was prejudicial error." -
In IJforrison v. Perry, (Aug. 17, 1943) 104 Utah 151, 
140 P. (2d) 772, 778, the Court stated: 
"Defendant's theory, which was supported 
by evidence, was that deceased, by driving on his 
left-hand side of the highway, and his failure to 
turn to his right side in time to avoid creating an 
emergency, did create an emergency which con-
fronted defendant through no fault of his. The 
court failed to pro1p,erl;y separ~ate the the,ories of 
the parties, but instead gave general ilnstructions 
,t'f';eating the .rights and duties of each driver as 
being mutual, w!ithout reg~ard to defend<ant's the-
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ory as to dece1ased's negligence in first being ~on 
his wrong side of the highwa;y. Defendant is en-
titled to have his case submitted to the jury on 
any theory justified by proper evidence. Morgan 
v. Bingham Stage Line Co., 75 Utah 87, 283 P. 
160; Hartley v. Salt Lake City, 41 Utah 121, 124 
P. 522; Pratt v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 57 
Utah 7, 169 P. 868; Smith v. Lenzi, 74 Utah 362, 
279 P. 893; Martineau v. Hanson, 47 Utah 549, 
155 P. 432.'' 
All of the foregoing argument and authority lends 
equal support to plaintiff's contention with respect to 
the Court's refusal to grant and give plaintiff's Request 
No. 3. By his Request No. 3 plaintiff sought to have the 
theory set forth in his complaint to the effect that it was 
defendant's duty to adopt and employ reasonably safe 
methods in carrying on its business presented to the jury. 
This request was refused. It correctly stated the law, and 
was supported by the evidence. It was pr·ejudicial error 
to refuse this request. 
It is respectfully submitted that the verdict itself 
conclusively demonstrates that the jury accepted the 
Court's instruction to the effect that the happening of 
the accident was no evidence of negligence and in the ab-
sence of positive instructions clearly presenting plain-
tiff's theory of the case, the jury no doubt believed that 
all of plaintiff's evidence on liability which pertained to 
the happening of the accident itself should be disre-
garded. 
Till 
~\] jj 
[[TED 
B: 
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GROUND III. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS NUMBERED 11 
AND 12, (R. 75, 76) WERE ERRONEOUS AND CONSTI-
TUTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
By Instruction Xo. 12 (R. 76) the Court instructed 
the jury as follo·ws : 
''You are instructed that if you find from a 
preponderance of the evidence in this case that 
Jorgensen came to his death solely as a result of 
his own negligence, then the plaintiff is not en-
titled to recover and your verdict should be in 
favor of the defendant 'no cause of action'." 
It is to be observed that under this instruction the 
jury could return a verdict of ''No Cause of Action'' if 
they found that the deceased was negligent and that such 
negligence was the sole cause of his death. The Court, 
in its Instruction No. 11 (R. 115), defined what conduct 
on the part of the deceased constituted negligence. In 
that instruction the Court stated: 
'' * * * I therefore instruct you that if you 
believe from the evidence in this case that Wen-
dell J or gens en knowingly placed himself in a 
position on the caboose in question that was less 
safe than other positions which had been provided 
for the performance of his duties, and he did so 
knowing that the position in which he placed 
himself, or in the exercise of ordinary care should 
have known, was less safe, then I instruct you that 
such action, if any you find, is negligence.'' 
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Obviously, under this instruction the jury was re-
quired to find that the deceased was negligent as matter 
of law if he placed himself in a position that was less 
safe than other positions which had been provided for 
the performance of his duties. Hence, the Court instruct-
ed the jury that such conduct constituted, as matter of 
law, negligence on the part of the deceased. 
The law is clear that the rule which these instruc-
tions apparently attempted to apply is that where there 
are two or more methods of performing work and the 
injured person knowingly takes a dangerous method 
when there are reasonably safe methods, he is guilty of 
negligence. That, however, is not the manner in which 
the rule was expounded to the jury here. There may 
be two ways of doing work, one of which is less safe 
than the other. But from the fact that one is compara-
tively less safe it does not follow that it is dangerous, 
nor does it follow that a person choosing a less safe way 
would be acting negligently in the sense that a reason-
ably prudent person would not have adopted that par-
ticular way. 
The recent case of Raymond v. Union Pacific R. 
Oo., (Utah) 191 Pac. (2d) 137, clear:ly states the dis-
tinction. There the Court stated: 
"'* * * He (plaintiff) placed his hand in a 
position which he knew to be aangerous, when 
there was a safe method open to him.'' 
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The Court did not say, and the language used cannot 
be stressed to mean, that if a person chooses a way less 
safe than another in doing his work he is guilty of negli-
gence as matter of law·. 
This matter of choice of methods was recently dis-
cussed by the United States Supreme Court in the case 
of TVilkerson r. LllcCarthy, (Utah), 69 S. Ct. 29, 413, and 
from the opinion we quote : 
"There was, as the state court pointed out, 
evidence to show that petitioner could have taken 
a slightly longer route and walked around the pit, 
thus avoiding the use of the board. This fact, 
however, under the terms of the Federal Employ-
ers Liability Act, would not completely immunize 
the respondents from liability if the injury was 
'in part' the result of respondents' negligence. 
For while petitionetr' s fa.ilu.re to use a safer 
method of crossing might be found by the jury 
to be contributory negligence, the Act provides 
that 'contributory negligence shall .not bar a re-
covery, but the damages shall be diminished by 
the jury in p1"opo.rtion to the ,amownt ,of negli-
gence attributable to such employee. * * * ' '' 
In the case of Condie v. Rio Grande Weste1"'n Rail-
waw Co., 34 Utah 237, 246, 247, 97 Pac. 120 (1908), this 
Court had this same proposition before it, except that in 
that case the trial court had refused the instru~tion 
requested by the defendant. The Supreme Court held 
that the statement contained in the requested instruction 
was erroneous and hence had been properly refused. 
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The first sentence of the requested instruction was as 
follows: 
'' * * * I charge you further as matter of 
law that it was the duty of the plaintiff's intestate 
to use ordinary care for his own safety, and 
choose the safest course in performing his work 
or in changing his position from one place to 
another whenever such safe course was open, 
plain, and obvious.* * *" 
In discussing this the Court stated: 
''The first sentence of the request is too 
broad. It is not the law that a servant is in duty 
bound 'to choose the safest course in performing 
his work.' That is to say, there may be two 
natural and usual ways of performing the work, 
each of which is reasonably safe, and neither 
dangerous, yet one may be safer than the other. 
In such case it cannot he said as matter of law 
that the servant is guilty of negligence because 
he did not choose the safer one. The first sentence 
of the request stated ahstrac:tly is in direct con-
flict with the second, wherein the principle is 
sought to be correctly applied that, where there 
is a natural and reasonably safe method of per-
forming the work, the servant who voluntarily or 
carelessly pursues a method which is ohviously 
dangerous or known to him to be so is guilty of 
contributory negligence. The request was, there-
fore, properly refused, though other portions of 
it may not be objectionable." 
The distinction which we seek to make between the 
rule as stated by the trial court and the proper rule is 
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well illustrated by this Condie case. The second sen-
tence of the requested instruction is stated as follows : 
'' * * * Therefore, if you find from the evi-
dence that at the time of the accident there was 
a reasonably safe way by which he might have 
come out from under the engine, if it was neces-
sary for him to come out at that time, and that 
lmder these conditions he chose a way manifestly 
and obviously unsafe and by this means lost his 
life, the plaintiff cannot recover, and your verdict 
must be for the defendant, 'No cause of action.' '' 
In referring to this sentence the Court stated: 
"* * * The last sentence of the request more 
nearly stated that law, and might properly have 
been given had not the conduct of the deceased 
with respect to an emergency, or an unexpected 
and sudden peril been involved.'' 
Here, the Court's instruction was contrary to the 
rule as announced in the second sentence of the request 
considered in the Condie case. The trial court did not 
require the jury to find that there was a reasonably 
safe way in which deceased could have performed his 
duties and that he chose a way which was ''manifestly 
and obviously unsafe.'' There was absolutely no re-
quirement in the instruction that deceased must have 
chosen an unsafe or dangerous way to perform his 
duties. In this case the only requirement was that the 
jury find that the method chosen by deceased was less 
safe than some other method. This, we submit, is n1is-
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statement of the law, as is clearly indicated by the fore-
going quotations from the Condie case. 
This Court also stated the rule applicable to choice 
of methods of work in the case of K(J;Un~arns v. White 
Star Gas & Oil Co., 92 Utah 24, 32, 63 Pac. 2d 231 (1937). 
In that case plaintiff was injured by an explosion of 
gasoline vapors in performing the work of transferring 
gasoline fron1 a tank car to a truck. Plaintiff had the 
choice of using one of two methods, either by using a 
pump operated by an electric motor or a pump operated 
by hand. Plaintiff chose to use the electric motor and 
defendant contended he was guilty of contributory neg-
ligence as a matter of law. The Court stated: 
"Upon the first proposition defendant in-
vokes the rule that 'when there are two or more 
methods or ways by which a servant may perform 
his duties, and he voluntarily chooses the most !~ti 
hazardous, knowing it to be such, he does so at ~"" 1 
his own risk.' Fritz v. Salt Lake & Ogden Gas & 
Elec. Light Co., 18 Utah 493, 56 P. 90, 93. 
''Defendant attempted to show that he had 
provided a hand pump to be used to load trucks 
direct from the tank cars and that this was the 
safe method of loading trucks, while using the 
electric equipment was more dangerous; that 
pJaintiff's use of the electric equipment was, 
therefore, negligence as a matter of law. 
''While we do not dispute the rule thus 
announced in the Fritz case, we are convinced 
it cannot be here invoked as contended by de-
fendant. .As stated in 39 C. J. 862: 
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'To render the rule operative against 
the servant it is neeessary that all of the 
essential elements of the rule should be 
present. Thus, it must appear that a safe 
or reasonably safe method of doing the 
work was available to the servant, that he 
knew, or in the exercise of reasonable eare 
should have known, of the existenee of sueh 
method, that the seleetion of the unsafe 
method was voluntary on his part, that he 
knew, or was chargeable with knowledge 
of, the danger inhering in the method 
chosen, and that the danger was so im-
minent and threatening that a man of ordi-
nary prudenee would not have taken the 
ehances of encountering it.' 
''The evidenee in this ease falls far short of 
establishing as a matter of law the essential ele-
ments enumerated in the above quotation.'' 
In Moore v. Miles, 108 Utah 167, 158 Pac. (2d) 676 
(1945), this Court again had occasion to consider the 
rule invol 'Ting ehoice of methods. The Court stated: 
"But defendant argues that since plaintiff 
had a choice of going down the stairway into the 
lobby, which admittedly was well lighted, or down 
the west stairway, to the parking lot, which plain-
tiff testified was dark, she was negligent as a 
matter of law because she chose the unsafe route. 
A similar situation was presented to the court 
in Williams v. City of New York, 214 N.Y. 259, 
108 N.E. 448, 449, and it was there said: 
'Another point urged against the 
plaintiff grows out of his conduct on the 
occasion of the accident. He had slipped 
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down on the sidewalk just before he fell 
the second time and broke his leg. He 
pursued his way along. the icy sidewalk 
instead of crossing the street to a sidewalk 
which was entirely clear. This, it is said, 
was contributory negligence, not merely 
justifying, but requiring, the nonsuit. It 
may have been contributory negligence as 
a matter of fact, but we think it was a 
question for the jury. In Twogood v. 
:Mayor etc., of New York, 102 N.Y. 216, 6 
N.E. 275, it was held to be a question for 
the jury whether a plaintiff was charge-
able with contributory negligence in ven-
turing upon a walk in an icy condition 
when she might have avoided all danger 
by going upon the walk on the other side 
of the street which was clear and safe.' 
''In the face of such facts, the court still held 
in the Williams Case that the question of con-
tributory negligence was for the jury. A similar 
case is Tillotson v. City of Davenport, 232 Iowa 
44, 4 N.W. 2d 365, 366, where the court likewise 
held that the question of contributory negligence 
was for the jury. The court said: 
'It is well settled that mere knowledge 
that a walk is dangerous, unsafe for travel, 
is not sufficient to establish contributory 
negligence though there is another way 
that is safe and convenient, and to defeat 
recovery it must appear that the traveler 
knew or as an ordinarily cautious person 
should have known that it was imprudent 
to use the walk. Templin v. City of Boone, 
127 Iowa 91, 102 N.W. 789; Reynolds v. 
City of Centerville, 151 Iowa 19, 129 N.W. 
949; Gibson v. City of Denison, 153 Iowa 
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320, 133 N.,V. 712, 38 L.R.A., N.S., 644; 
Travers v. City of Emmetsburg, 190 Iowa 
717, 180 N.,Y. 753; Lundy v. City of Ames, 
202 Iowa 100, 209 N.W. 427; Franks v. 
Siou..."{ City, 229 Iowa 1097, 296 N.W. 224.' 
"'In view of the foregoing authorities, and 
the long established rule in this jurisdiction, that 
contributory negligence is a question for a jury, 
we hold that the issue of contributory negligence 
·was properly submitted to the jury by the trial 
court.'' 
The trial Court's instructions herein criticized were 
given upon requests made by defendant. Defendant's 
counsel were undoubtedly misled by the rule stated in 
35 .Am. Jur., p. 680, Master and Servant, Section 250, 
wherein that text-writer states as follows: 
''In determining whether the employee was 
responsible, in any degree for the happening of 
the calamity, one plain criterion is this: If the 
employee, having had an opportunity of acting 
in one of two or more ways, of which one was less 
safe than another, and knowingly chose the less 
safe mode, he is to be deemed negligent and dis-
entitled to recover although the employer may 
also have been negligent.'' 
However, as established by the CondJie case, the 
rule is stated too broadly. The authorities cited by the 
text-writer failed to support such statement of the law. 
He cites the following cases: 
Dilley v. Primos Chemical Oo., 64 Colo. 361, 171 
P. 1146, citing R.CL; 
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Germarn-Amerioarn_ Lumber Co. v. Bammah, 60 Fla. 
70, 53 So. 516, 30 LRA(N1S) 882; 
New York, C. d!; St. L.R. Oo. v. Bamlin, 170 Ind. 
20, 83 N.E. 343, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 881, 15 Ann. 
Cas. 988; 
Schoultz v. Eck(J;rdt Mfg. Co., 112 La. 568, 36 So. 
593, 104 Am. St. Rep. 452; 
Balt.imore Boo1t d!; Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Jamar, 93 Md. 
404,49 A. 847,86 Am. St. Rep. 428; 
Hurst v. Kansas City, P. d!; G. R. Co., 163 Mo. 
309, 63 S.W. 695, 85 Am. St. Rep. 539; 
Cleveland, A. & C. R. Co·. v. VViorkmarn, 66 Ohio 
St. 509, 64 N.E. 582, 90 Am. St. Rep. 602; 
Stratton v. C. H. Nichols Lumber Co., 39 Wash. 
323, 81 P. 831, 109 Am. St. Rep. 881 ; 
Anno.: 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 646. 
In Dilley v. Primos Chemioal Co., supra, the trial 
court directed a verdict for the defendant and such rul-
ing was affirmed on the ground that plaintiff was guilty 
of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Plaintiff 
was a miner and he and his partner rode a tram car 
down a steep grade when the two men could have walked 
behind the car and checked its speed as it progressed 
down the grade. The Court quoted the rule expressed 
in Oolonado & So. Ry. Co. v. Reyrnolds, 51 Colo. 231, 
116 P. 1043, 1044, as follows: 
'' * * * where a person has a choice of two 
methods of performing his work, the one safe and 
the other dangerous, and is aware of this fact, 
it is his duty to choose the safe method. If he 
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does not, and chooses the method which neces-
sarily exposes hin1 to danger, which would have 
been avoided had he chosen the other, and is in-
jured, he cannot recover for such injury.'' 
True it is that the court quoted from 18 R.C.L. 636, 
"Jf.aster and Serrant, Section 132, as follows: 
'• If the employee having an opportunity of 
acting in any one of two or more ways, one of 
·which is less safe than another, and knowingly 
chooses the less safe mode, he is to be deemed 
negligent and disentitled to recover although the 
employer may also have been negligent.'' 
However, as can be plainly seen, the language in such 
quotation does not express the rule as set forth in the 
quotation from the earlier Colorado case. It is further 
to be noted that the quotation from Ruling Case Law 
cites the same cases as does American Juris prudence, 
with the exception of the Dilley case, and our discus-
sion of those cases, we submit, will establish to the satis-
faction of any one that the rule expressed in Ruling Case 
Law and American Juris prudence is incorrect. 
The court in the Dilley case relies on further grounds 
of contributory negligence as shown by the following 
quotations : 
''Not only did the plaintiff choose the less 
safe way of working, but after getting on the 
car he took no precautions for his safety, and did 
not attempt to get off the car as the speed in-
creased. He admitted that he could have stepped 
off before the car attained increased momentum, 
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and that he knew from what he had seen before 
that the car gained a great deal of speed in going 
downgrade.'' 
The next case cited IS that of German- Amerioa;n 
Lumber Co. v. Han;na.h, supra. In that case plaintiff in 
going for a babbit ladle passed over a ten-inch plank 
which was very close to a 'turning shaft. A projecting 
screw caught on his clothing and he was injured. A ver-
dict for plaintiff was reversed and the court stated: 
"Where dangers are obvious and the servant 
is capable of appreciating them, a warning as to 
such dangers by the master is unnecessary.'' 
"It is not a case of using one of several usual 
means for discharging a duty * * * . But it is a 
case of the use of an obviously dangerous means 
when safe means were available.'' 
In the case of New Yrork, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Ham-
lin, supra, plaintiff, a railroad switchman, was riding 
on a lead car being shoved to a coupling with a standing 
car. While moving at two miles per hour he dismounted 
and walked in front of the moving car and attempted 
to open the coupler. His leg caught on a nail and he 
was injured. The evidence disclosed that he could in 
safety have stopped the train and then adjusted the 
coupler. In performing his duty as he did the court held 
he was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of 
law. The rule was there stated as follows: 
lr 
'' * * * When there are two known ways of -:rei! 
doing a thing-one safe and the other unsafe- ,i~ 1 
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if the servant Yoluntarily and knowingly chooses 
the unsafe way, because easier and more conven-
ient, or for other personal reasons, he will be 
held guilty of negligence and if injured by rea-
son of such negligence he will have no remedy. 
" =~~= =~~= =~~=He had both knowledge of the hazard 
and the authority to make the safe way avail-
able; and haYing, with his eyes open, voluntarily 
chosen the unsafe way, \Ye see no escape from 
bringing his case within the operation of the rule 
before stated. * * * At the tin1e he selected the 
unsafe method he had before him two safe ways, 
both available, and both under his absolute con-
trol, and neither of which would have delayed 
the movement of the cars more than one minute.'' 
In Schoult.z 'C. Eckardt ~l!fg. Co., supra, plaintiff 
while fixing a belt on a saw hit his hand against the saw 
and his fingers were cut off. One of the grounds of 
negligence relied upon by plaintiff was that he could not 
stop this saw without stopping the machinery of the 
mill. The evidence, however, disclosed that plaintiff 
could have stopped the saw had he so desired. The court 
stated the rule as follows: 
''If, therefore, he incurred any extra risk 
he did so voluntarily. If there is a safe and un-
safe way of doing a thing, and the servant knows · 
it, or ought to know it, and chooses the unsafe, 
and is injured, he cannot recover against the 
master for the injury.'' 
In Baltimore Boot & Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Jamar, supra, 
a freight elevator fell on plaintiff and injured him. The 
jury was instructed that plaintiff would not be contri-
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butorily negligent in going under the elevator if it was 
necessary in the ordinary and usual performance of his 
duties and if he had been assigned to this duty as a 
convict and was compelled to obey. This instruction was 
held correct in view of other instructions that plaintiff 
would be contributorily negligent if he might have 
operated the elevator from outside without going under 
it, or if he saw it was cut, or if he did not heed calls 
to stand out of the way of the elevator. There is ab-
solutely no statement in this case which would indicate 
that plaintiff would be contributorily negligent as a mat-
ter of law if he chose a less safe way of performing 
his duties. A reading of the case discloses that the 
court clearly had in mind the situation where a servant 
has an obviously safe way of performing his duties and 
knowingly chooses an unsafe method. 
In Hurst v. Kans'as City, P. & G. R. Co., supra, 
plaintiff boarded a moving caboose. He could have 
stopped the caboose before mounting. The Court stated: 
"Plaintiff had the choice of two ways to 
board the caboose-one that was not dangerous 
(that is, having the car to stop) and the other 
that was dangerous (that is, boarding the car 
. while moving at a rate of speed of about six 
m.p.h.). He chose the latter. There was nothing 
to distract his attention and no excuse whatever 
for his attempt to board the car at the time and 
under the circumstances. The rule of the de-
fendant did not require him to do so, and having 
voluntarily chosen the way of boarding the car 
which was dangerous he must be held to have 
been guilty of contributory negligence.'' 
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The court quoted with approval the rules laid down in 
Bailey on Personal Injuries, as follows: 
.Also: 
'' • • • "\Yhere an employee of a railroad 
knowingly accepts a dangerous way, when a 
safer one is apparent to him, and he is thereby 
injured, he is guilty of contributory negligence.'' 
· '"\Vhere a person having a choice of two 
\\-ays, one of which is perfectly safe, and the 
other of which is subject to risks and dangers, 
voluntarily chooses the latter and is injured, he 
is guilty of contributory negligence.'' 
In the case of Cleveland A. & C. R. Co. t:. Workman, 
supra, the deceased was using a speeder on a main line 
track and an extra train ran into him. There was a side 
track on which he could have gone with absolute safety. 
A verdict for plaintiff was reversed because of the re-
fusal of the trial court to give an instruction that if 
the defendant chose to ride on a speeder on the main 
line track with a friend in violation of an order of his 
superior for no reason connected with his employment, 
when there was a passing track on which he could have 
ridden with absolute safety, and he chose to go on the 
main line track without keeping a lookout, he was guilty 
of contributory negligence. This instruction involved in 
the Cleveland case is certainly greatly different from the 
instruction that was given in the case at bar. 
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In Stratt>on v. C. H. Nrichols Lumber Co., 39 Wash. 
323, 81 P. 831, 834, supra, deceased in doing the work as-
signed to him as a servant could have stood in a perfectly 
safe place without coming near or in contact with an 
operating shaft with which he in fact came in contact. 
The contention of the defendant, which was upheld by 
the court, was expressed as follows: 
'' * * * where a servant has an opportunity 
of doing work in two ways, one safe and the 
other dangerous, and accepts the dangerous 
method, he is guilty of contributory negligence." 
The annotation cited by the text writer, 19 L.R.A. 
(N.S.) 646, has nothing to do with the rule stated by the 
text writer. The subject of that annotation is" Servant's 
Assumption of Risk of the Master's Breach of a Statu-
tory Duty." 
The annotation in 15 Ann. Oas. 995, referred to by 
the text writer, is one entitled "Contributory Negligence 
of Servant in Failing to Choose Safer of Two Ways to 
Couple Cars." The Annotator states the rule he gleans 
from the cases as follows: 
"It is well settled that where a servant know-
ingly selects a more dangerous way to couple 
or uncouple cars when there is a comparatively 
safe way of which he knows or ought to know, 
and which he may choose, and he is thereby in-
jured, he is guilty of contributory negligence 
and cannot recover.'' 
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"'\Ye respectfully submit that the foregoing authori-
ties cited and relied upon by the text writer of American 
Jurisprudence do not support the rule as there set 
forth. A n1on1ent 's consideration will reveal that for a 
workman to choose a less safe course of doing his work 
cannot be contributory negligence as a matter of law. 
The fundamental rule of contributory negligence is that 
a person must use the care that a reasonably prudent 
person would use in looking out for his own safety. 
There are, of course, situations in which the conduct of 
an injured person may be such that all reasonable minds 
would agree that he did not use such care. In that event 
he would be guilty of contributory negligence as a mat-
ter of law. However, the choosing of a way less safe than 
another does not require a finding of contributory negli-
gence for the simple reason that a reasonably prudent 
person, knowing both ways, may have chosen the less 
safe way. This is clearly pointed out in the quotation 
from the Utah Condie case, above quoted. This distinc-
tion is clearly pointed out in Bailey v. Prime Western 
Spelte.r Co., 83 Kan. 230, 109 P. 791 (1910), wherein the 
Court stated: 
" * * * However, it may be observed that at 
common law the adoption of a method not so 
safe as another does not necessarily constitute 
contributory negligence. The course pursued 
must in addition be so dangerous that a reason-
ably prudent person would not adopt it. * * * 
Therefore, the fact that the decedent used his 
hand instead of a shovel does not convict him 
of contributory negligence.'' 
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In this case there was evidence that the hook on the 
safety chain on the caboose was smaller than the or-
dinary and customarily used hook. Deceased certainly 
was not required to anticipate the negligence of the 
defendant under that evidence in supplying that parti-
cular hook. The only possible reason which could make 
the place near the front of the caboose less safe than 
another would be that the chain and hook were not ade-
quate for the purpose of protecting deceased and their 
inadequacy was due entirely to the failure of defendant 
to furnish the ordinary type of hook and chain. 
This principle is well illustrated by the case of 
B.rinkmeier v. Missouri Pao.ific Ry. Co., 69 Kan. 738, 77 
Pac. 586, 588. In that case plaintiff, in attempting to ad-
just a drawbar at the time of a coupling operation, used 
his foot and one of the drawbars being out of line slipped 
by the other and injured plaintiff. A directed verdict 
for the defendant was reversed. The Court stated: 
'' * * * The plaintiff did not know and was 
not bound to anticipate, that the drawheads would 
pass each other, and it is only on the assumption 
that no man of ordinary prudence would have 
used his foot to control the refractory bar that 
plaintiff could be declared to be negligent as a 
matter of law. 
" * * * The law is plain that a plaintiff may 
not recover for injuries resulting from his volun-
tary choice of an unsafe method of doing his 
work when a safe one is open to him. * * * But 
to be unsafe a method must be such that a rea-
sonably prudent man would not, under all the 
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circun1stances adopt it. The question must al-
ways finally be resolved with reference to that 
standard. If seYeral ways be open, and one of 
them be such that a reasonably prudent man 
'vould choose it, no negligence can be imputed to 
the choice, even if all the others be absolutely 
safe.'' 
It is to be noted that the court here again places 
emphasis upon the fundamental proposition that the 
question is whether or not a reasonably prudent man 
would have chosen the place or method which was chosen 
by the deceased. This proposition was not left to the 
determination of the jury, but the jury was instructed 
as a matter of law that to choose a less safe place than 
some other, regardless of whether the place chosen was 
dangerous and regardless of whether or not the place 
not chosen was reasonably safe, was negligence as mat-
ter of law. So far as the instruction given is concerned, 
the jury might well have thought that the safer place 
which deceased did not choose was the one inside the 
caboose with the door shut and in considering this mat-
ter the jury was not told whether or not the convenience 
of performing the duties of his employment had anything 
to do with the choosing of the place to work. The in-
struction eliminated any consideration of the appear-
ances of safety to deceased. True it is that after the 
event it may be that a person could say that a position 
chosen was less safe, but that, we submit, is not the 
test. The test again is whether or not a reasonably pru-
dent person would have chosen that position. This 
principle is well illustrated by McEl~igott v. Ra;n.do,lph, 
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61 Conn. 157, 22 A. 1094, 29 L.R.A. 181 ( 1891), wherein 
the Court stated: 
''Plaintiff, at the time of the accident, was 
sitting upon the hub of the wheel engaged in his 
work. This position was a convenient one for him. 
It was apparently to his observation at least, a 
safe one also. That, as between two apparently 
safe positions, he failed to choose the one which. 
proved to be safe in fact, certainly cannot be 
ascribed to him as negligence.'' 
Another case of interest is that of Bell v. Terminal 
R. R. Assoc. 10/ St. Louis, 322 Mo., p. 886, 18 S. \V. (2d) 
40. This was an action for personal injuries founded 
upon state law, wherein plaintiff in alighting from an 
engine slipped on the icy steps and fell. The jury was 
instructed that if plaintiff was aware of the ice and 
snow on the steps and that a reasonably prudent per-
son under like or similar circumstances would realize 
that there was danger of slipping if he stepped thereon, 
plaintiff was not entitled to recover because of contri-
butory negligence. This instruction was held error and 
a verdict for defendant was reversed. The Court stated: 
'' * * * the plaintiff would not for that reason 
be guilty of negligence in using the icy steps. A 
servant cannot be convicted of negligenee 'unless 
the danger' is ' so glaring' as to threaten immed-
iate injury * * * . The instruction is erroneous 
and prejudicial.'' 
The proper approach to the problem involved is well 
set forth in Mid-Continent Pet.roleum Corp. v. Hane, 
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~ 56 F. (2d) 989, 991, 992 (10 C.C.A. 1932). Defendant 
appealed from a judgment in favor of plaintiff. Defend-
ant contended that the deceased was contributorily negli-
gent as a matter of la\Y. In carrying water to prime a 
pump in a shed he carried it over a 2x4 which was be-
tween the wall of the shed and the pun1p. He slipped or 
tripped on this 2x± and fell into the cog wheels and was 
killed. Defendant contended that deceased should have 
gone around the pump the other way and that his fail-
ure to do so 'constituted contributory negligence as a 
matter of law. The Court stated: 
"Where there are two ways, one compara-
tively safe and the other dangerous, known to 
the servant, by means of which he may discharge 
his duties, it is want of ordinary care for him 
to select and use the more dangerous way. * * * 
''In determining between two ways of per-
forming his duties, both of which are attendant 
with danger, a servant is not guilty of contribu-
tory negligence if he makes such a choice as a 
reasonably prudent man under the circumstances 
might have made, even if future events indi-
cates that he chose unwisely. * * * 
"Where uncertainty as to the existence of 
contributory negligence arises either because of 
a conflict in the testimony or because, the facts 
being undisputed, fair minded men will honestly 
draw different conclusions from them, the ques-
tion is not one of law for the court but of fact 
for the determination of the jury. * * * 
"It follows that Landrum was not guilty of 
contributory negligence as a matter of law, unless 
it can be said that the danger of the route whJch 
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he undertook to travel was so great and so ob-
vious that fair minded men would agree that a 
person of ordinary prudence under the existing 
circumstances would not have undertaken it.'' 
The rule of law which ·defendant seeks to invoke 
is also illustrated by the ease of Atlantic Coast Lilne R. 
Co. v. Davis, 279 U. S. 34, 49 S. Ct. 210, 211-12, 73 L. Ed. 
601, wherein the Court stated: 
'' '* * * he voluntarily abandoned the safe 
position on the running board which he at first 
assumed, and placed himself in a position of ex-
treme danger on the 'jack-arm', a place not furn-
ished for the performance of this work, and ill-
adapted thereto, and one of obvious danger in 
which he would inevitably be struck if the boom 
made a full swing unless he moved out of its path; 
and thereby through his own negligence, as the 
sole and direct cause of the accident, brought 
on his own death.'' 
We submit that it was substantial and prejudicial 
error for the court to give Instructions Nos. 11 and 12, 
for the reason that a finding of the facts therein set forth 
does not constitute negligence as a matter of law. Plain-
tiff also submits that the giving of Insruction No. 12 
constituted prejudicial error for the reason that there 
was no evidence which would justify a finding that any 
negligence of the deceased in assuming a position near 
the chain was the sole proximate cause of the injury 
and death of the deceased. Croft stated, as hereinabove 
pointed out, that it was proper for hrakmen to perform 
their duties_ at any point on the platform and that when 
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he operated the tail hose he usually stood where J or-
gensen was standing when Croft last saw him. 
In Thomson v. Boles, 123 F. (2d) 487, 492, (8 C.C.A. 
1941), a similar situation was presented. In that case 
the plaintiff was employed as a brakeman and was on 
the day of his injury engaged in getting signals to the 
engineer of a work train employed on the defendant's line 
in driving piles in a certain bridge. Plaintiff admitted 
that he was leaning against the guard rail when it gave 
way and resulted in his injures. The Court stated: 
'' * * * But does plaintiff's admission that 
he was leaning against the railing bar his right 
to recovery herein¥ The evidence indicates that 
employees of the train crew during similar opera-
tions frequently leaned or lounged against a rail-
ing of this kind. The very limited area in which 
they were obliged to work and pass one another 
would tend to induce such position. Plaintiff 
merely did that which other employees did under 
similar circumstances. His own immediate su-
perior assumed a similar position just prior to 
the accident. The evidence does not indicate that 
he subjected the railing to an extraordinary 
strain, nor was the position he maintained or as-
sumed one which was inherently dangerous. The 
danger arose because of the defective and worn-
out fence rail, the condition of which plaintiff 
was not informed or aware. Such conduct could 
not be held, as a matter of law, such a departure 
or abandonment of a safe place to work provided 
by the employer so as to relieve it from liability 
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on account of a negligently and carelessly con-
structed and maintained guardrail. Clearly, 
therefore, it was for the jury to determine 
whether plaintiff, in carrying on his work on the 
day of the accident, assumed any position in 
leaning or lounging against the rail which was 
contrary to the usual and customary practice. 
Moreover, the departure, if any, from the usual 
and customary practice would not he a complete 
defense, but would merely constitute contribu-
tory negligence. Terminal Ry. Ass 'n. of St. Louis 
v. Farris, 8 Cir., 69 F. 2d 779; Norfolk & W. R. Co. 
v. Riggs, 6 Cir., 98 F. 2d 612; Rocco v. Lehigh 
Valley R. Co., 288 U. S. 275, 53 S. Ct. 343, 77 
L. Ed. 743. The question of plaintiff's contribu-
tory negligence was properly submitted to the 
jury, and the negligence, if any, of plaintiff in 
assuming the position he did under the circum-
stances, if the same contributed to the accident, 
would not defeat recovery under the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act.'~ 
We submit that under the evidence the jury would 
not be justified in finding from the fact that deceased 
stood by the chain, that the sole proximate cause of his 
death was neglect on his part, when the very purpose 
of the chain was to prevent men from falling off the car. 
Its inadequacy for that purpose must necessarily have 
contributed to the death of plaintiff. Any negligence 
which might be attributed to the deceased could only 
be contributory negligence and not a complete defense 
to this action, yet Instruction No. 12 permitted the jury 
to reach such result. 
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GROU~D IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN RECEIVING DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT "4", THE 
MOVING PICTURE FILM, IN EVIDENCE AND PERMIT-
TING DEFENDANT TO DISPLAY SUCH FILM TO THE 
JURY IN LIEU OF ARGUMENT. 
~loving pictures cannot be introduced in evidence 
until it has been made to appear that the pictures will 
-enable the Court and jury to understand or apply es-
tablished facts to the particular matter at hand. Mov-
ing pictures cannot be introduced to contradict sworn 
testimony in the absence of sworn contradictory evidence. 
Moving pictures cannot be used for the purpose of 
supplying contradictory testimony, where none such has 
been otherwise introduced. ~loving pictures are illus-
trative and dependent in nature and cannot be received 
as independent evidence. We believe that this principle 
has been established by decisions of this Court. 
In Dederichs v. Salt Lake City Railroad Oompawy 
(1896) 14 Utah 137, 46 Pac. 656, 657, the defendant of-
fered three photographs showing the locality where an 
accident occurred. There was testimony that the pie-
tures accurately showed the condition of the train and 
the general location of the accident. Plaintiff objected 
and the pictures were excluded by the court. On appeal 
this Court set up the rule which we feel is still applicable 
to all photographic evidence: 
'' * * * that photographic scenes are ad-
missible in evidence as appropriate aids to the 
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jury in applying the evidence, whether it relates 
to persons, things, or places. It is a well-estab-
lished rule, applied in everyday practice in courts, 
that diagrams and maps illustrating the scenes 
of a transaction, and the relative location of ob-
jects, if proved to be correct, are admissible in 
evidence, in order to enable the court or jury 
to understand and apply the established facts to 
the particular case. '' 
It will be noted that the court said the purpose of 
photographs was to enable the court or jury to under-
stand or apply the established facts to the particular 
case. 
The next Utah case dealing directly with photo-
graphic evidence is Johnson v. Union Pacific R. Co., 35 
Utah 285, 100 P. 390. In the Johnson case photo-
graphs were offered of a wreck taken the day after the 
wreck had occurred. It was objected to on the ground 
that some of the conditions had been changed since the 
wreck and that some of the ties which had been torn up 
were broken and bunched. No valid objection could be 
taken that the photographs did not illustrate the con-
dition of the wreck over which there was no controversy. 
Pictures were allowed over the objection of the defend-
ant and the rule established in the Dederichs case cited 
above was reiterated, the court again saying that photo-
graphs were admissible in evidence to aid the court or 
jury to apply the facts proved to the particular case. 
Having this background in mind let us look at 
other authorities relating to photographic evidence. 
There can be very little doubt but what the same basic 
~QOll 
J~!ll 
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principles which govern the admission of still pictures 
governs the admission of motion pictures. After all mo-
tion pictures are but a series of still pictures. Courts 
state, however, that a greater degree of caution should 
be exercised in admitting motion pictures because the 
dangers of false prospective or intentional fabrication 
are very great. Two basic questions in laying the foun-
dation for the admission of motion pictures then assume 
great importance. First, the accuracy of the motion pic-
ture, and second, the relevancy of the motion picture. 
Jezcell1llorri.s r. E. I. Dupont, 129 A.L.R. 352. Wigmo.re 
on Eridence, Vol. 3, Sec. 798 (a), p. 203. 
~\.s to accuracy and relevancy, both the problem of 
accuracy and relevancy are satisfactory where an ac-
curate picture is taken of the actual scene of a crime 
or accident prior to the time that any material change 
has taken place. The accuracy difficulty is also answered 
where the parties can stipulate that the scene of the 
accident or crime has been reconstructed accurately. 
However, we have found no case after an exhaustive 
search of all the authorities which has allowed a moving 
picture to be shown where the only purpose of the mov-
ing picture was to show one or the other of the parties 
theory or contention and that theory or contention is 
disputed. There can be no doubt whatever that artificial 
reconstruction in which a moving picture is involved 
would involve great and special risks of misleading. 
Pandolfo v. U. 8., (7th C.C.A.) 286 F. 8. In the Pandolfo 
case the district court judge when he discovered that 
the pictures which plaintiff proposed to show had been 
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taken and produced under the direction of plaintiff's ad-
vertising manager, excluded them forthwith, recognizing 
the danger of exaggeration, and that the pictures would 
not show the normal situation in the plan where they 
were taken. 
In another United States Circuit Court case the 
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, DeCamp 
v. Unit·ed St,ates, 10 F. (2d) 984, 985, held that moving 
pictures were properly excluded. In that case the de-
fendants offered moving pictures in evidence to refute 
the principal charges of the government, which charges 
accused the defendants of fraudulently representing that 
glass caskets could be made. The following quotation 
states what we believe the law to be and sets down sound 
legal principles which we ask this court to apply: 
'' * * * It was to meet this evidence that the 
moving picture was produced and offered. We 
think the court was right in refusing to admit 
the picture in ·evidence. A motion picture does 
not of itself prove an actual occurrence. The thing 
reproduced must be established by the testimony 
of witnesses. While the photograph may be a 
proper representation of the thing produced, yet 
the testimony of witnesses is required to verify 
the production. 'Theoretically, of course, the 
moving picture can never be assumed to represent 
the actual occurrence; what is seen in it is merely 
what certain witness·es say was the thing that 
happened, and, moreover, the party's hired 
agents may so construct it as to go considerably 
further in his favor than the witnesses' testimony t 
has gone, and yet any moving picture is apt to 
cause forgetfulness of this, and to impress the ~rt 
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jury with the convincing in1partiality of Nature 
herself. In Yie'Y of these inherent risks of mis-
leading, the trial judge n1ay well deem a picture 
unsafe and inadmissible, when the introductory 
eYidence has not convinced hin1 that the risk is 
negligible.' ( 3}' "\Yignwre on Evidence, Sec. 798.) 
'' Testin1ony was produced on behalf of the 
defendants tending to show the process of manu-
facture of glass caskets of different sizes and in 
all stages, and with this evidence before the jury 
it was for the trial court to determine whether a 
photograph or moving picture, such as was of-
fered, was sufficiently verified as a proper repres-
entation of the process of manufacture as it ac-
tually existed. This court will not assume, on 
this record, to determine this question, and if, 
as contended by counsel for appellant, the testi-
mony relative to the process of manufacture com-
pletely verifies the picture, then he cannot suc-
cessfully claim injury from the refusal of the 
court to repeat this testimony to the jury by a 
moving picture display of the facts already in 
evidence. This is not the case of a photograph 
used to show the relative position of different ob-
jects, or to reconcile disputed issues of fact. The 
proof as to conditions of manufacture at the Okla-
homa plant were testified to by witnesses pre-
sumed to be familiar with existing conditions; 
hence the admission of the motion pictures would 
have amounted to nothing more than a spectacu-
lar display of a situation based upon facts in evi-
dence.'' 
See also Sprifnkle v. Da·vis, 111 F. (2d) 925 (4th 
C.C.A.). Aside from the inherent dangers of motion pic-
tures an examination of photography and its n~e in the 
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trial of a lawsuit will he enlightening. The soundness of 
the two Utah cases, heretofore cited i.e., Dederichs v. 
Salt Lake City R. Co., 14 Utah 137, 46 P. 656, and John-
son v. Union Pacific R. Co., 35 Utah 285, 100 P. 390, is 
demonstrated by a great number of cases. See 83 A.L.R. 
1315; 129 A.L.R. 361; Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. 3, Sec. 
798, p. 201; L.R.A. 1917 F 980. The principles which 
all of the authorities we have examined establish is to the 
effect that photography is only admit;sible to enable the 
court and jury to understand and apply the established 
facts to the particular case. 
At a very early date in the case of Babb v. Oxford 
Baper Company, 99 Maine 298, 59 Atl. 290, 292 (1904) 
the principle was established that photographs are not 
admissible to demonstrate a party's contention or theory 
of how any particular accident occurred. In the Babb case 
the plaintiff was an employee whose job it had been to 
keep two conveyor belts which carried coal, clean of 
debris and in proper working order. Plaintiff had been 
stationed in a narrow. space between the two conveyor 
belts. As he was bending over inspecting one of the con-
veyors, something fell from the roof, presumably a chunk 
of ash or coal and hit him in the head causing him to 
lose his balance and his foot to be injured by the con-
veyor belt. The question most seriously in dispute be-
tween the plaintiff and the defendant, his employer, was 
as to how the accident occurred. Defendant offered 
photographs of the place where the defendant was in-
jured, with men in various assumed positions, which the 
plaintiff they contended had been in. The lower court ~I 
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~;: refused to allow the photographs in evidence. His ruling 
~- was upheld by the Supreme Court of ::Maine in the fol-
lowing language : 
''To be admissible, photographs should sim-
ply show conditions existing at the time in ques-
tion. But photographs taken to show more than 
this, with men in various assumed postures and 
things in various assumed situations in order to 
illustrate the claims and contentions of the 
parties, should not be admitted. An examination 
-'- of the excluded photographs show that they fall 
within the latter class. They would serve merely 
to illustrate certain theories of the defendant as 
to how the accident happened. They were pro-
perly excluded as a matter of law.'' 
The Babb case, we believe, is good law. Following 
the Babb case we have the Supreme Court of the State 
of Oklahoma taking up and considering the question 
which was before the Maine Court. 
In Colonial Refining Co. v. Lathrop (June 6, 1917) 
64 Okla. 47, 166 P. 747, 748, the Oklahoma Court con-
sidered a case in which the plaintiff, an employee, was 
burned with sulphuric acid. He was assisting another em-
ployee to fill jugs from a large tank of acid on defend-
ant's premises. As the two employees were filling the 
jugs, plaintiff's testimony indicated that a jug, partly 
filled with acid, began to slide off the vat in which the 
acid was stored and plaintiff, in order to prevent the 
jug from falling, grabbed it and the acid contained in 
the jug was spilled upon his face and hands. Defendant 
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offered photographs which showed a man standing in 
the assumed position upon the tank or vat where plain-
tiff had received his injuries. In each picture, in addi-
tion to the n1an, a jug was shown to be sitting in differ-
ent locations on the top of the tank. The trial court re-
fused to allow the pictures in evidence and this ruling 
on appeal was sustained by the Supreme Court in the 
following language: 
''The Court * * * properly refused to admit 
in evidence these pictures, which were intended 
to illustrate a hypothetical situation, and to ex-
plain the theory of the defendant as to how the 
injuries complained of might have occurred.'' 
The court then cites the B·abb case and Stewart v. St. 
Parul Ry. Co., 80 N. W. 855, 78 Minn. 110. This latter case 
was an action by a husband for personal injuries to his 
wife. The wife having stepped off a street car into a 
hole in the street. Defendant offered pictures to show 
distance from the car step to the hole. These pictures 
were not admitted, the Court saying at page 855: 
''Photographs are frequently admitted in 
evidence as either secondary or demonstrative 
evidence according to the method of their use. 
In this case the photograph was evidently off·ered 
as demonstrative evidence. As such they are com-
petent whenever it is important that the locus in 
quo or any object, person or thing be described 
to the jury. In such case they serve to explain or 
illustrate and apply the testimony and are aids 
to the court or jury in comprehending the ques-
tions in dispute as effected by the evidence.'' 
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The pictures in the Babb case, in the Colonial Refin-
ing case and in the Stewart case were still pictures-
they were not moving pictures, and when the court in 
those cases properly excluded the photographs because 
they were atten1pts by one party or another to establish 
his contentions through the use of pictures of hypotheti-
cal or reconstructed scenes, they did so without con-
sidering the greater danger of fabrication and misrep-
resentation which the moving picture involved. (See 
DeCamp v. United States). For other examples of courts 
excluding still pictures 'vhere they were taken of recon-
structed or hypothetical scenes, see Field v. Gowdy, 
(1908) 85 N. E. 884. The court excluded picture of 
water flowing onto plaintiff's sidewalk offered by defen-
dant to disprove plaintiff's contention. Everson v. 
Casualty Co., 9-1 N. E. 459, Massey v. Ivester, 33 P. (2d) 
765, Empire Oil & Refiining Co. v. Fields, 112 P. (2d) 
395, 27 A.L.R. 913. 
. 
We have searched diligently and have not been 
able to discover a single case in which a motion picture 
of an artificially reconstructed scene has been allowed 
in evidence to show the sway or movement of a railroad 
car or other vehicle. There are several cases in which 
the use of motion pictures for that purpose have been 
prohibited by the courts. In this regard the case of 
Stat,e fior the use ~of Chima v. United R·ailwa;ys & Electric 
Co., 162 Md. 404, 159 Atl. 916, 83 A.L.R. 1307, 1315, is 
an example. In that case the trial court excluded a 
moving picture of a railroad car, which picture was offer-
ed for the purpose of showing that the sway of the car 
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was unusual or extraordinary. The court there in sus-
taining the lower court's exercise of discretion said: 
'' * * * In the moving picture, the car, be-
cause of greater speed, might possibly have 
swayed more than the car in which the accident 
took place. If so, the sway of that car could not 
be relied upon as representing the movements of 
the car in question. Moreover, the rapidity of the 
movement or the sway of the car appearing on 
the screen was subject to the manipulation of the 
cameraman who to·ok the picture of the car. It 
was within his power to make the movements ap-
pear faster or slower than the car was actually 
going. Questions of convenience and possible con-
fusion in the courtroom might have to be con-
sidered. When moving pictures might and might 
not be used advantageously and properly in plac-
ing the facts before juries is a question the answer 
to which must vary with one case and another, 
and we think the decision in each case must be 
left largely to the judgment and discretion of the 
presiding judge, without any restricting general 
formula laid down to control him. In this case 
there were other available means of proving with 
a0curacy the movements of the car, and we do not 
see any ground for holding that the court acted 
erroneously in excluding the resort to moving 
pictures.'' 
(See the annotations following the Chima case, which 
discussed rather fully the use of moving pictures.) 
Another important case in which the exclusion of 
the trial court of motion pictures taken by one of the 
parties to demonstrate his theory of the evidence was 
·::J, 
1.\ 
fol 
~~t 
~'.1 ~n 
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upheld is Jlon·is r. E. I. Dn Pont De Nenwurs & Co., 
139 S. ,Y. (2d) ~18-1, 129 ~\.L.R. 352. 
Following the JI orris case are cited several of the 
cases which haYe been decided on the question of the 
use of moving pictures. 
~\case not noted in the A.L.R. citation is Hadrian v. 
11/ilzcaukee Elec. Ry. atnd Transportation Co., 1 N. W. 
(2d) 755 ( 19-12). In the Hadrian case the plaintiff offered 
a moving picture which demonstrated her theory of 
how she was injured. The picture was of a railroad car 
coming around a turn and passing a safety zone. Plain-
tiff had placed various dummies on the safety zone to 
show how the train as it came around the curve over-
lapped the safety zone and would knock the dummies 
over which were placed on the zone. The trial court 
allowed the motion picture to be shown to the jury 
and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed the trial 
court because of this ruling, the court stating that the 
movies could not help, that these pictures did not rep-
resent distance, they misrepresented it. 
A great number of moving pictures have been al-
lowed in evidence for an entirely different purpose, many 
to show an actual event. For instance, moving pictures 
have been used a great number of times to show a plain-
tiff who is claiming to be totally or seriously disabled in-
dulging in the normal activities and moving about in 
ways which he claims he is unable to do. A good example 
of this type of case is Boyarski v. G. A. Zilmmerma;n 
Corp., 370 N. Y. Supp. 134. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
128 
All of the authorities agree on one other funda-
mental proposition, i.e., before a moving picture can be 
shown to the jury a foundation must be laid, which foun-
dation shows and demonstrates to the court that the pic-
tures which are being offered accurately and truly re-
flect the event which they claim to depict. Before the pie-
tures can be admitted anything exaggerated or mini-
mized must be explained by the person offering the pie-
ture to the jury. In this connection the angle in which 
the picture was taken, the speed at which the camera 
was run, the way that it was developed, the exposure 
conditions, the projector and the screen as well as the 
competency of the operator must be considered by the 
court before he can exercise the discretion that is his. 
In this connection see 27 Ill. Law Review 424 (Dec. 1932) 
and Wigmore Vol. 3, Sec. 798 (a) p. 203. 
Motion pictures cannot be admitted in evidence until 
a proper foundation has been laid and in this connection 
the judge's discretion is a reasonable one and one which 
must not be exercised arbitrarily. Cincinrnati H. & D. 
Ry. Co. v. DeOnzo, (Ohio 1912) 100 N. E. 320. 
In this connection we call the court's attention to 
the fact that all of the witnesses, which includes those 
who testified on behalf of the defendant, testified that 
the caboose upon which the plaintiff was riding swayed, 
jumped and moved excessively and yet the picture which 
the defendant offered and which was admitted by the 
court did not show the extent of this swaying, jump-
ing and movement. Counsel for defendant used the pic-
:rrar 
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ture not only to contradict his own witnesses but the 
plaintiff's witnesses and for this purpose all the cases 
which we have been able to discover state that photo-
graphs and n1oving pictures are incompetent. Photo-
graphs and moving pictures can only be introduced for 
the purpose of illustrating and demonstrating the facts 
which have been proven by the testimony and witnesses 
produced at the trial. These moving pictures improperly 
recei\ed in evidence were used by the defendant in lieu 
of argument and the error committed in their admission 
was thereby multiplied. This was prejudicial error. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the Honorable 
Clarence E. Baker exercised sound and just discretion 
in granting plaintiff's motion for new trial; that no 
abuse of discretion has been shown and. that the judg-
ment appealed from should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, BLACK & ROBERTS 
WAYNE L. BLACK 
Cou.nsel for Plailntiff and Respondent 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
t 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
